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Boston personalism has generally been recognized as a philosophic
system based upon a metaphysical idealism. What is less known, however,
is that the founder of this school ofthought and some of the major
contributors to the early development of this tradition were committed
members of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
The purpose of this study is to examine the contributions made by the
early Boston personalists to the cause of theological liberalism in the
Methodist Church. It will be shown that personalist philosophers and
theologians at Boston University ushered in and consolidated the liberal era
in Methodist theology. Further, it will be argued that the religious demands
of the philosophy of personalism eventually led some members of the
tradition from theological liberalism to modernism and the beginnings of a
religious pluralism. In other words, the thesis of this study is that the early
Boston personalists were theological innovators in the Methodist Church,
leading the denomination from its nineteenth-eentury evangelical pietism to
the modernism and pluralism that was part of mid-twentieth century
American Protestantism.
The focus of this study will therefore be on the first two generations of
personalists at Boston University: the founder ofthe personalist tradition,
Borden Parker Bowne, and two of his most prominent students, Albert
Cornelius Knudson and Edgar Sheffield Brightman. One chapter is devoted
to each of figure, focused upon the impact of their personalist philosophy
and methodology on their theology and philosophy of religion, and their
influence on American Methodist theology.
The period this study, which commences from the time of Bowne's
appointment to the Department of Philosophy at Boston University in 1876
to the death of both Knudson and Brightman in 1953, reveals how
Methodism grappled with the theological implications raised by the
complexities of modernity and the emerging sciences. Attention will be
focused on how the philosophical method of the personalists dictated their
movement from pietism toward liberalism and onto modernism and
pluralism. As such, this study demonstrates the integral role played by the
Boston personalist tradition in theological development during the liberal era
of American Methodism.
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I initially stumbled onto Boston personalism in a course on
metaphysics under Professor John Hammond during the winter of 1993
when I read a critique of Edgar S. Brightman's doctrine of The Given in
Charles Hartshorne's Creativity in American Philosophy. After a little
further digging, I felt that I had found, in Boston personalism, the
convergence of philosophy, theology, and religion which I wanted to
explore in my degree on intellectual history. As I conclude my work on
this thesis, I am glad to report that I have not been disappointed in my
expectations.
I have accrued much indebtedness during the research and writing of
the last two years. Special thanks to the interlibrary loan staff at Fort
Vancouver Regional Library for their endless patience and professionalism
in processing the voluminous number of requests that were submitted. I am
also appreciative of the staffs at Christian Theological Seminary,
Indianapolis, Indiana, and the Mugar Library of Boston University for their
assistance in securing sources otherwise inaccessible to me.
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I am grateful to the members of my committee who have endured the
inquiries I have made as a student of religion attempting to attain some
proficiency as an intellectual historian. I have learned much about
intellectual history from Professors Michael Reardon, Craig Wollner, and
Ann Fulton which the following pages do not reveal. Professor Wollner's
persistent questioning regarding the structure of this thesis has been
especially invaluable.
Professor Hammond, my first teacher in philosophy, introduced me to
Kant, and has patiently worked with me through a number of independent
study courses on the history of American philosophy. I am grateful for his
keen philosophical eye in this study as well as the stylistic suggestions that
he has volunteered.
I also consider myself providentially blessed in having had the services
of an outside reader, Rufus Burrow, Jr., fifth-generation personalist and
presently Associate Professor of Church and Society at Christian Theological
Seminary. As the foremost interpreter and proponent of the Boston
personalist tradition today, Dr. Burrow has, since the summer of 1993 when
I was first advised to contact him regarding my interest in the subject, been
an inestimable resource. His perspicuity for details regarding the Boston
vpersonalist tradition was evident in the extensive comments which he jotted
throughout the first draft of my manuscript. He and the others, however,
are completely absolved from any remaining errors of fact or interpretation
as these are mine alone. In repayment for his kindness in going beyond the
call of duty to provide criticism, assistance and encouragement throughout, I
can only hope that this study contributes something to the renaissance of
personalism of which he has been the most recent and ardent advocate.
Every effort to use inclusive language has been made in this study.
Because such was not a consideration for the early Boston personalists, I
have retained the patriarchal language prevalent throughout their writings
whenever directly quoted. It is important to note, however, that consistent
personalism cannot but include and acknowledge the worth and full
personhood of both genders.
Finally, my wife, Alma, has been extremely supportive throughout
this period, and I am especially grateful to her for her labor oflove--which I
will never be able to repay--in nurturing our three children: Aizaiah, Alyssa
and Annalisa. My prayer is that her efforts will be rewarded as they make
their journeys as little selves toward full personhood.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study will focus on the Boston personalist tradition and on its
role as the dominant school ofliberal theology in American Methodism from
1876-1953. Central to my purpose will be to show how the first two
generations of personalist philosophers and theologians of Boston University
-Borden Parker Bowne, Albert Cornelius Knudson, and Edgar Sheffield
Brightman-ushered in and consolidated the liberal era in the Methodist
church. Further, I will argue that the religious demands of personalism
eventually led some members of the tradition from theological liberalism to
modernism and the beginnings of a religious pluralism. In other words, I
will show how the Boston personalists performed as theological innovators
in the Methodist church, leading the denomination from its nineteenth
century evangelical pietism to liberalism and later onto the modernism and
pluralism that was part of mid-twentieth century American Protestantism.
Surveys of American philosophy have generally neglected the
2personalist tradition. So also have introductory textbooks on theology in
American Protestantism. This research paper will seek to fill the lacuna in
both fields with this account of select personalists at Boston University.
The import of this study is further heightened when one observes the
almost complete neglect of the role played by the Boston personalists in the
histories of American Methodism.l Even when they are discussed (however
meagerly), the focus is usually on their theological contributions and almost
never on the intellectual foundations and philosophical method so crucial to
the personalist enterprise.f While some attention has been paid to the
development of Methodist theology up through the middle of the twentieth
century, and while Bowne himself has been the subject of an intellectual
biography, to my knowledge no booklength monograph deals adequately
with the philosophical and intellectual issues which the Boston personalists
grappled with during the era of theological liberalism which my study
1This oversight is especially noticeable in Frederick A. NOIWOOd,The Story of
AmericanMethodism, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1974), who refers to Bowne, Knudson,
and Brightman a combined total of six limes in a volume of almost 450 pages.
2 So The History ifAmericanMethodism, gen. ed., Emory S. Burke, 3 vols.
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1964); see the essay by William J. McCutcheon, "American
Methodist Thought and Theology, 1919-1960,M 3:261-327. NOIWood, The Story if
American Methodism, 319, mentions "personalism" only once, and that inconsequentially,
a rather unforgivable slight considering that two ofhis chapters are 1itled "New Theology"
and "New Liberalism .... "
3covers.' This investigation will seek to bring to light the incisive role which
personalist philosophy played in the development of Methodist theology.
Focusing on the early Boston personalists limits this study in three
ways. Firstly, our attention will be on the early generations of personalists--
Bowne, Knudson, and Brightman. Later Boston personalists will be
referred to only as they inform our understanding of these individuals.
Secondly, centering on the personalist tradition at Boston University means
that mine will not be an exhaustive investigation ofliberalism in American
Methodism. It does, however, highlight the fact that while there were many
3I have been able to identify one book and two dissertations on the history of
American Methodist theology, all covering parts of the period proposed in my study:
RobertE. Chiles, Theological Transition in American Methodism, 1790-1935 (New
York! Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1965); Leland Howard Scott, "Methodist Theology in
America in the Nineteenth Century" (ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1954); and
William J. McCutcheon, "Theology of the Methodist Episcopal Church During the
Interwar Period (1919-1939)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1960; reprint, Ann
Arbor, M1: University Microfilm Int., 1990). Chiles, focusing strictly on theological
development, limits his discussion of Knudson to theology; further, his work is admittedly
an exposition of theological systems rather than a strictly historical investigation. Scott's
discussion of Bowne is limited to three (out of over 500) pages. McCutcheon's
dissertation does deal with both Knudson and Brightman, but understandably neglects
Bowne. None of these address the relationship between philosophy and theology, much
less the influence of Boston personalism on Methodist theology. Another earlier
dissertation, William Henry Bernhardt's "The Influence of Borden Parker Bowne upon
Theological Thought in the Methodist Episcopal Church" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago, 1928), is a comparative analysis of Bowne's influence in theological method and
content on his colleagues and students (including Knudson and Brightman). The strength
of this somewhat dated work, however, lies in its systematic assessment rather than in its
historical treatment of the subject.
4other liberal Methodist theologians of repute who influenced the
denomination, it is only in the personalist tradition at Boston University that
we find a "school of thought" rallying around a common liberal theme."
Finally, this study converges on Boston personalism over and against the
vast spectrum of personalist philosophies. 5 These others will receive brief
mention only as they influenced the early Boston personalists.
A'word regarding the dates of this study is appropriate. For the
terminus a quo, I have chosen the year when Bowne accepted his first
appointment to the Department of Philosophy at Boston University. Aside
from one book and a few essays, most of his publications followed after this
date. The year 1953 saw the death of both Knudson and Brightman, and
thus serves as an appropriate terminus ad quem.
4 Other early personalists include Bishop Francis J. McConnell (later Bowne's
biographer), the philosopher Ralph Tyler Flewelling, and the religious educator, George
Albert Coe. Flewelling's and Coe's impact on Methodism, however, would be much
more difficult to ascertain since neither taught at a Methodist institution, whereas Bowne,
Knudson and Brightman were all teachers at Boston University.
5 There is as yet no detailed comparative study on the variety of personalist
philosophies. Albert C. Knudson's The Philosophy 0/Personalism: A Study in the
Metaphysics of Religion (New York: Abingdon Press, 1927) leans too much towards
Bowne's personal idealism. Edgar S. Brightman's "Personalism (Including Personal
Idealism)," A History of Philosophioal Systems, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: The
Philosophical Library, 1950), 340-52, is still the most useful succinct statement. For an
excellent discussion of personalist philosophies in America through the early part of this
century, see Hiram Chester Weld, "Some Types of Personalism in the United States"
(ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1944).
5It is important at this juncture to briefly define the primary "<isms"
which will be used frequently in this study: the all important personalism,
evangelical pietism, liberalism, evangelical liberalism, modernism, and
pluralism. These concise definitions will be more fully explicated in the
course of this study.
"Personalism" and its cognates in this study will refer to the
philosophy of Bowne and his disciples. Briefly stated, it is a philosophical
idealism which understands persons or personality to be the fundamental
metaphysical category;" it is also unabashedly theistic. In answer to the
question "What is Boston personalism?", Paul Deats, a fourth generation
personalist, answered as follows:
Personalism is a species of Personal Idealism .... Persons
experience self-identity in change (memory), are active in knowing
and choosing, are purposive and value-seeking, and are at least
potentially rational. Personalist methodology is empirical in
consulting human experience as a whole. Personalist epistemology
is dualistic, postulating an objective order that we find and do not
construct. . . . Boston personalists are metaphysical pluralists, to
account for the facts of error, evil, and ignorance. In social
'The idealism of the personalists held to the primacy of mind over matter in
contrast to "realism" which posited the object of knowledge as having existence
independent of (any) mind. It is important to note here, however, that the Boston
personalists did not understand these as disparate categorizations. They were metaphysical
idealists on the one hand, and epistemological realists on the other. More on this below.
6philosophy, the inter-personal focus typically becomes democratic
and reformist. 7
The remainder of this paper is devoted to explicating this brief statement and
relating it to the theological views of the early personalists.
The term "evangelical pietism" captures the religious sentiments of
many Methodists (including Bowne) at the end of the nineteenth century.
These sentiments combined Wesleyan pietism, Edwardsean and Finneyite
revivalism, and the individual and social perfectionism of the nineteenth-
century." Especially important for the purposes of my thesis is that the
theology of evangelical pietism was authoritarian in method and traditional
in nature, erected as it was primarily upon the Bible and the historic creeds
ofthe Christian chnrch.
When using the term "liberalism," I will be referring primarily to the
rationalistic methodology of American Protestant theology at the tum of the
t Paul Deats, "Introduction to Boston Personalism," The Boston Personalist
Tradition in Philosophy, Social Ethics, and Theology, eds. Paul Deats and Carol Robb
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986), 3. To my knowledge, this collection of
(auto )biographical and expository essays is the only published work devoted to the Boston
personalist tradition. Because of its format, however, it lacks the cohesiveness which a
historical study would offer regarding the first two generations of Boston personalism.
S See Bruce L. Shelley, Evangelicalism in America (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdrnans Publishing Company, 1967). Especially important for understanding nineteenth-
century social Christianity in America is Timothy L. Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform
(New York: Abingdon Press, 1976).
7twentieth-century. While I am aware of the normal association ofliberalism
with the Ritschlian School and the Social Gospel, theological details varied
from movement to movement if not from individual to individual. I will
therefore emphasize the theological method of liberalism as defined by the
University of Chicago Divinity School liberal, Gerald Birney Smith (1868-
1929). Smith adequately defined "liberal theology" as "a term designating a
type of religious thinking in which freedom of discussion and the right of
dissent from traditional doctrine is encouraged for the sake of a closer
relation between religion and culture.t" Along these lines, "evangelical
liberalism" would then refer to the attempted synthesis of the evangelical
pietism representative of the nineteenth-century and the theological and
doctrinal rationalism which flowered at the turn of the twentieth.
In a real sense, the terms "liberalism" and "modernism" are in many
ways synonymous. In this study, however, I agree with James Livingston
who follows a consensus that defines "modernism" as a more radical
movement of theological liberalism in America in the years 1910-1940.
Known also as the "Chicago School," this movement was characterized by
9Gerald Bimey Smith, "Liberal Theology," inA Dictionary of Religion and Ethics,
eds, Shailer Matthews and Gerald B. Smith (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921),
258.
8an empirical and naturalistic theological method which was much more
exacting than that espoused by the evangelical liberals. 10 I will therefore use
the term to denote this more rigorous and radical theological method.
Finally, when I use "pluralism," I want to avoid the contemporary
ethical, social, and economic implications of the phrase, and focus instead on
its theological and religious significance. Theologically, "pluralism" denotes
the belief that all religions are viable paths to salvation, and that none are
intrinsically superior to any other. 11 This is a step beyond the "inclusivism"
of liberalism that asserts the validity of all religions, albeit ultimately inferior
to and subsumed under Christianity. Both stand against the "exclusivism"
of traditional orthodoxy which insists on Christianity alone as true, and all
other religions as false, in the quest for salvation.
10 See James C. livingston, Modern Christian Thought/rom the Enlightenment to
the Vatican II (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), 418:1f. The chief members
of the "Chicago School" were either faculty members or former students of the Divinity
School including Smith himself, Shailer Matthews (1863-1941), Douglas Clyde Macintosh
(1877-1948), and a little later, Henry Nelson Wieman (1884-1975). It is important to note
that during the first half of this century, the "modernist" label was more of a prejorative
one by which conservative thinkers referred to the more radical liberals. Only later did the
distinction between "liberalism" and "modernism" obtain, and that for purposes of
historical organization; it is in this later sense that this term and concept will be used here.
11Grant Wacker, "A Plural World: The Protestant Awakening to World Religions,"
Between the Times: The Travail a/the Protestant Establishment in America, 1900-1960,
ed. William R. Hutchison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 253-77, tells of
the growing attraction of the pluralistic view among liberal Protestants during the years
between the 1893 World's Exposition in Chicago and the 1950s.
9In attempting this historical theology, my primary approach will be via
a combined biographical and intellectual history. I have therefore attempted
to acquaint myself with the lives and thought of the main characters of this
study. This includes being thoroughly conversant with both the primary as
well as secondary literature on the subject.
I will devote one chapter each to Bowne, Knudson, and Brightman,
wherein I attempt three things. First, I will delineate their intellectual
journeys. Second, in the body of these chapters, I will seek to explicate the
impact of their personalist philosophy and methodology on their theology
and philosophy of religion. In conclusion, I will identify the ways in which
their formulations significantly influenced the development of American
Methodist theology.
My task also demands an awareness ofthe history of American
Christianity (especially of Methodism) during the period covered by this
study, along with some familiarity with the history of American philosophy.
These will be the subject of Chapter II. There, I will establish, in order, the




American theology and philosophy in the middle of the nineteenth
century was complicated during the 1860s and 70s by the eruption of
Darwinian biology. Darwin's evolutionary theory by means of natural
selection had not only undermined the age-old argument from design, but
also shattered the traditional "block universe" of Greek metaphysics,
positing in its place a new Weltanschauung that emphasized dynamism,
process, and change. Various efforts were made to conceive the urgent
synthesis demanded by the intellectual situation. The most distinguished of
these may have been the famous Metaphysical Club that met at Harvard
University. Members of this group developed Darwin's ideas both in the
direction ofthe materialistic agnosticism propounded by the Englishman,
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), and in the evolutionary metaphysics of the
logician, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). Philosophers and theologians
now had to wrestle with the questions raised by modern science.
11
PHILOSOPHICAL CURRENTS
The early Boston personalists were by no means isolated from these
issues. They understood the demands of the hour and rose to integrate
science and theology. Above all, as men profoundly impacted by the
thought of the Enlightenment, they, like many others, sought a critical and
rational foundation. The personalism that they formed cannot be understood
in isolation from the other philosophical movements of their times.
Among the leading schools of thought during the last half ofthe
nineteenth century was the philosophy named after its Scottish originators.
Herbert Schneider, a leading historian of American philosophy, has noted
that "the Scottish Enlightenment was probably the most potent single
tradition in the American Enlightenment.'?' Known also as "Scottish
Common Sense" or "Scottish Realism," its advocates appealed to both
"reason" and "moral sense" in opposition to such idealisms as the
mentalistic spiritualism of the Irish philosopher, George Berkeley (1685-
1753). Against Berkeley's denial ofthe existence of material things, they
affirmed an epistemology that posited the real, independent existence of
1Herbert W. Schneider, A History of American Philosophy (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1946), 246
12
objects of perception as attested by popular sensibility. Centered in America
primarily at Princeton, the latter half of the nineteenth century saw president
James McCosh (1811-94) and his Presbyterian colleagues (including the
venerable Charles Hodge), vigorously attempt a theological synthesis of
philosophy and evolutionary science. In their scheme, Darwinism was
objected to only where it was at odds with the idea of teleological design.'
In 1887, McCosh went on to call for a realistic American philosophy,
"opposed to idealism on the one hand and to agnosticism on the other.',3
Personalists like Bowne, however, questioned the metaphysical adequacy of
the Scottish realists and insisted on going beneath the surface appearance of
things for a more accurate understanding of reality.
The rise of idealism in America during the latter half of the nineteenth
century can be attributed in part to the rejection of the realistic philosophies
of the previous generation whose materialistic and naturalistic systems of
'For a more complete discussion of these figures as well as the broad spectrum of
evangelical responses to Darwin, see David N. Livingston, Darwin's Forgotten Defenders:
The Encounter Between Evangelical Theology and Evolutionary Thought (Grand Rapids,
MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987).
3 James McCosh, Realistic Philosophy, quoted in Schneider, A History of
American Philosophy, 249. McCosh was referring primarily to the speculative idealism
of the German philosopher, G. W. F. Hegel, and his American followers at St. Louis, and
to the English agnostic, Herbert Spencer, and his doctrine of the "Unknowable."
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thought neglected concepts such as mind and consciousness. As such,
idealists posited the primacy of mind, both as the foundational priority
for metaphysics and in its activity in epistemology.
The euphoria of evolutionary theism found among the Scottish realists
also caught the attention of some idealists philosophers. One, George
Holmes Howison (1834-1916) at the University of California, named his
system "personal idealism.?" In his spiritualistic and pluralistic cosmology,
he emphasized teleology and understood God as final cause while denying
the doctrine of creation. Although he taught at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology for a time (1872-78), his personal idealism was developed
concurrently with Bowne's personalism after he landed on the other coast at
• Howison's major work was The Limits 0/Evolution and Other Essays
Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism (1901). The concept of
persons and personality loomed large on the philosophical and theological horizons during
this time, especially among the British idealists. In looking just at book titles, both Bowne
and Howison were anticipated by A. S. Pringle-Pattison's 1887 Hegelianism and
Personality, and J. R. Illingworth's 1894 Bampton Lectures, Personality Human and
Divine (reprinted in 1913). In addition, a collection of essays was published in 1902 by a
group of Oxford philosophers under the title Personal Idealism (from whom Howison
took great pains to distinguish himself). Of greatest circulation may have been C. C. J.
Webb's 1918-19 Gifford Lectures published in two volumes: God and Personality and
Divine Personality and Human Life. Theological treatises included R. C. Moberly,
Atonement and Personality (1901), and, somewhat later, John Oman, Grace and
Personality (1925). This brief listing serves to highlight the idealistic emphasis on mind,
consciousness, and personality which reigned during this period over the realism, atomism,
and materialism of the previous generation.
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Berkeley."
Whereas there were various idealistic philosophies promulgated at
the turn of the twentieth century, all were overshadowed by the Absolute
Idealism of the Harvard philosopher, Josiah Royce (1855-1916). Royce
introduced his Infinite or Absolute as a resolution to the fragmented (atomic)
conception of reality posited by the realistic philosophies of the previous
generation. As will be seen, in this doctrine Royce found himself in
substantial agreement with Bowne's doctrine of the World-Ground.6
It is also important to realize that Royce's Absolutism was developed
in part against the pluralism of his more distinguished Harvard colleague,
the psychologist-turned-philosopher William James (1842-1910). James, in
turn, refined his own philosophy, known also as radical empiricism or
5 This distinction is important since there are significant differences between
Howison's and Bowne's philosophies in spite of the similar names. It is doubtful that they
were completely ignorant of each other, although there is no evidence of any mutual
influence. Here, Ihave been assisted by Rufus Burrow, Jr., who in personal
correspondence, has cautioned that "there are at least a dozen types!" of personalisms, and
that one need to be clear in identifYing which one is being referred to (Letter to the author,
2 July 1993); more on this below.
6Of Bowne, Royce wrote, "I suppose that our agreements were rather on the
increase toward the end of his work. Ialways prized him much" (initially in the Methodist
Review 105 [1922J, reprinted in Edgar S. Brightman, "The Sources of Bowne's Power,"
Studies in Personalism: Selected Writings of Edgar Sheffield Brightman, eds. Warren E.
Steinkraus and Robert N. Beck [Utica, NY: Meridian Publishing Co., 1984J, 96).
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pragmatism, in his efforts to refute Royce. For James, idealistic monisms
(such as Royce's Absolute) could not adequately account for the disparate
facts of reality such as human freedom and the problem of evil. Further, the
abstract speculations characteristic of the idealisms at that time did not suit
the more empirically minded James." Ironically, the idealism of the Boston
personalists would be more consonant in many ways with James' pluralism.
While they agreed with Royce in the primacy of mind, they sided with James
in asserting the ontic reality and freedom of the individual.
The next generation at Harvard brought the arrival from England of
the mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947).
Whitehead's philosophy of organism posited a panpsychistic cosmology that
emphasized sentience, dynamic movement, and atomic realities. In this way,
he succeeded in combining both idealistic and realistic elements, integrating
science and metaphysics. There was both sympathy and criticism expressed
by later personalists such as Brightman for Whitehead and his disciples.
It is by no means insignificant that Whitehead's philosophy included a
healthy dose of realism since the resurgence of realism was given impetus by
7 For a detailed treatment of the James-Royce debates, see Bruce Kuldick, The Rise
of American Philosophy: Cambridge. Massachusetts. 1860-1930 (1977; reprint ed., New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), Part ill.
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two of his colleagues at Cambridge." The first realistic reaction, known as
"Nee-Realism," was led by a student of James, Ralph Barton Perry (1876-
1957), and consolidated by a his joint efforts with five others in their 1912
publication, The New Realism. Advancing beyond the Scottish realism of
the previous century, the Nee-Realists attempted both to answer Royce's
attack on realism and to set forth a scientifically based reformed program of
constructive realistic philosophy. These in turn were followed by the Critical
Realists whose strength "lay in attack.t" This offensive against idealism
aggressively combined an empirical method, a realistic epistemology, and
naturalistic materialism. As wi1lbe shown, second generation personalists
were much more empirical than Bowne had been. In addition, the
epistemological dualism of the personalists paralleled the realistic theory of
knowledge to a certain extent. The personalists, however, soundly rejected
the naturalism and materialism of these later realistic philosophies.
"Namely, G. E. Moore (1873-1958), the anaIy1ic philosopher, with his famous
essay titled "The Refutation ofIdealism" in 1903, and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), the
naturalist philosopher, whose influence was felt across the Atlantic. Their chief targets
were the absolute idealisms of their countrymen, F. H. Bradley (1846-1924) and Bernard
Bosanquet (1848-1923).
9Frederick Copleston, A History a/Philosophy, vol. Vlll: Bentham toRusselJ
(1967; reprint ed., New YOlk Image Books, 1985), 391. Members of this group included
George Santayana (1863-1952) of Harvard, Arthur O. Lovejoy (1873-1962) of John
Hopkins, and Roy Wood Sellers (1880-1973) of the University of Michigan.
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None of these currents escaped the attention of the personalists.
While similar in many ways to the various schools of idealism because of
their idealistic vision, there were just as many crucial points of divergence
which separated the personalists from their philosophical relatives. In a very
real sense, the Boston personalists hammered out their system in response
to both their idealistic kinsmen and their realistic opponents while
attempting to reconcile their theistic philosophy with modem science.
THEOLOGICAL LIBERALISM IN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM
The Boston personalists, however, were also committed churchmen.
As such, their task was complicated by another complex variable, that of
doctrinal orthodoxy. Their personalistic theology was forged against the
developing liberalism among Protestant denominations.
Orthodoxy in the nineteenth century had to weather one theological
storm after another. From the Unitarianism and universalism in the first half
to the post-Darwinian debates and the rise of Fundamentalism during the
latter part of the century, the winds of doctrine teemed with ideas from
Europe. From Germany came Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), whose
"theology of feeling" subjectivised the nature of theology; F. C. Baur (1792-
18
1860), whose historical-critical method disavowed the supernatural origins
of Christianity; and Albrecht Ritschl (1822-89), whose moral theology
rejected all forms of mysticism and metaphysics. From France came the
positivism of August Comte (1798-1857), who asserted that the advance of
science had effectively displaced the theological and metaphysical
speculations of past generations, and Ernst Renan (1823-92), whose
celebrated Life of Jesus (1863) bore the stamp ofComte in leading toward
theological skepticism. From England came the already mentioned
evolutionary philosophy and religious agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, and
the imposing character of the renowned atheist, Bertrand Russell. The
struggle of the various denominations during this period to maintain
theological orthodoxy while adjusting to modernity was marked by both
ecclesiastical squabbles and heresy trials.'?
Central to the theological revolution which was occurring at this time
was the issue of theological method. The preeminent historian of dogma,
Jaroslav Pelikan, has said that
10 For a brief, yet thorough discussion of the intellectual turmoil in American
Protestantism during this later period, see Kenneth Scott Latourette, Christianity in a
Revolutionary Age, vol. ill: The 19th Century Outside Europe (1961; reprint ed., Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1969), Chapter VIT.
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... the modem period in the history of Christian doctrine may be
defined as the time when doctrines that had been assumed more than
debated for most of Christian history were themselves called into
question: the idea of revelation, the uniqueness of Christ, the authority
of Scripture, the expectation oflife after death, even the very
transcendence of God. II
The battle lines were thereby drawn, separating the conservative (and later
Fundamentalists) from the evangelical liberals and the modernists especially
on the questions surrounding authority and revelation. The conservatives,
following the Princeton apologists, continued to stand on the doctrine ofthe
divine inspiration and infallibility of Scripture, and clung to both the Bible
and the historical creeds as authoritative revelations of the one true God and
the Christian religion. On the other end of the spectrum, the modernists
repudiated dogmatic reliance on these sources and subjected both to the
findings of modem science and scholarship. As a mediating group, the
evangelical liberals (including the Boston personalists) sought to de-
emphasize dogmatic theological and doctrinal speculations while retaining
the centrality of Christ and the Christian ethic; their objective was to
harmonize religion and science, and to make Christianity intelligible to the
II Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of
Doctrine, vol. 5, Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700) (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1989), viii.
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modem mind.
Sydney Ahlstrom has identified seven main tenets in the liberal creed
of American Protestantism at the tum of the twentieth century:
1. tolerance for intellectual and creedal diversity
2. ArminianJPelagian view of humanity
3. emphasis on ethical preaching and moral education
4. optimism regarding human progress
5. a historical understanding of religion
6. a strong monistic tendency in philosophical and theological issues
7. emphasis on God's immanence rather than transcendence. 12
All of these were exemplified in a movement known as the Social Gospel.
The champion of the Social Gospel was Walter Rauschenbusch
(1861-1918). Deeply influenced by the Ritschlian theology, he called for a
social understanding of Christianity and for moral responsibility. The
emergence of this movement at this point in history can be understood as
reflective of the general mood of American intellectual life, finding other
expressions in political Populism and the great agrarian crusades. As heirs
of both the social revivalism and individual pietism of nineteenth century
Wesleyan Methodism, the personalists also emphasized social themes in
their theological works. World War I shattered the optimism of the Social
12 Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New HavenJLondon:
Yale University Press, 1972), 779-81.
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Gospellers, and whatever impulse sustained by the movement in the 1920s
was effectively ended by the Great Depression of the following decade.
The demise of the vitality of the Social Gospel also heralded the
advent ofNeo-Orthodoxy after the first World War. Taking their cue from
the Danish thinker, Soren Kierkegaard (1813-55), whose theology of
paradox called for a fideistic response to the ambiguities of human existence,
Lutheran theologians like Karl Barth (1886-1968) and Emil Brunner (1889-
1966) resoundingly rejected both the rationalism and the optimism of the
liberalism which preceded them. In calling for a return to biblical theology,
Barth was especially hostile toward all forms of natural theology. While it is
true the Nco-Orthodox theologians were severely critical of the rationalism
of much ofliberal theology, they by no means advocated a return to a
simplistic biblicism. Rather, they were historically erudite both theologically
and philosophically. As such, the Boston personalists recognized the threat
posed by the Nee-Orthodox thinkers and took these assailants of reason to
task in defense of their own philosophical and theological method.
In contrast to Barth who rejected natural theology, the modernists
sought to develop theology as an empirical science. With the arrival of the
various scientific disciplines at the turn of the century, these thinkers denied
22
that theology occupied a ruling position over other fields of knowledge.
Rather, as Kenneth Cauthen has summarized, the modernists insisted that
the standard by which the abiding values of the Christianity of the
past were to be measured was derived from the presuppositions of
modem science, philosophy, psychology, and social thought. Nothing
was to be believed because it was to be found in the Bible or Christian
tradition .... The thinking of these men was not Christocentric. Jesus
was important--and even unique--because he illustrated truths and
values which are universally relevant. However, these truths and
values can be validated and even discovered apart from Jesus."
Because personalists like Brightman agreed that liberal theology needed to
be more empirical, he himself was, at certain points, hard pressed to reject
the radical conclusions called for by strict empiricism."
As Protestants, the personalists were very much concerned with the
theological movements sketched here. In addition, however, they were
also loyal Methodists, and as such, also had to reckon specifically with the
Wesleyan theological tradition.
13Kenneth Cauthen, The Impact of American Religious Liberalism (New York:
Harper & Row, 1962), 29.
l4Interestingly, Brightman's radical conclusions reached via his radical empiricism
haveled some to question whether or not he even believed inGod at all (see Walter G.
Muelder, "Edgar S. Brightman: Person and Moral Philosopher," inDeats and Robb, eds.,
The Boston Personalist Tradition, 107).
,,,
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METHODISM AT THE END OF NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA
Early nineteenth century Methodist theology stood on the foundation
of its Wesleyan origins. Initially reliant on their British predecessors,
American Methodist theologians did not make substantial contributions of
their own until the latter part ofthe nineteenth century. 15 The Methodist
historian, Leland Scott, concludes that the quest of American Methodist
theology during this time was motivated by the dual concerns of
individuality and of evangelicalism. The former emphasized personal
experience (including moral agency) and personal holiness (perfectionist
piety), and the latter doctrinal orthodoxy (especially a Calvinistic soteriology
which underscored the divine initiative of salvation based upon the centrality
of Christ and his atoning work)." Thus, for example, the Methodist
doctrine of entire sanctification-the belief in the possibility of attaining a
"Theologians of distinction included Daniel Denison Whedon (1808-85) who
edited theMethodist Quarterly Review from 1856-81, Miner Raymond (1811-97) at
Garrett Biblical Institute, Thomas O. Summers (1811-97 also) at Vanderbilt University,
John Miley (1813-95) at Drew Theological Seminary, and Wi1liarnF. Warren (1833-1929)
at Boston University. For a compact statement of the contributions of these men, see
David C. Shipley, "The Development of Theology in American Methodism in the
Nineteenth Century," London Quarterly & Holborn Review 28 (1959): 249-64.
,. Leland Howard Scott, "Methodist Theology in America in the Nineteenth
Century," 517-519.
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state of heart holiness purged from the corruption of original sin--while
formulated in such a way as to inspire personal holiness and social action,
was also understood as resting on divine favor rather than on earned merit.
With the onslaught of modem science and scholarship, after 1870 the
stubborn determination of the Methodists to sustain theological orthodoxy
gave way to "a desire to encourage contemporary intellectual relevancy, even
if it meant the revision of traditional doctrinal formulations."!" It is not
coincidental that this same period featured the rise to prominence of several
Methodist educational institutions as well as the first sustained period of
theological productivity by the denomination's thinkers. The emergence of
personalism at Boston University was the most aggressive effort within
Methodist circles to come to terms with the complexities of modernity.
Boston University was incorporated on 26 May 1869. Its Board, a
group ofloyal Methodists, followed their founder, John Wesley, in
upholding a tolerant attitude with regard to the non-essentials of doctrine. 18
17 Leland H. Scott, "The Methodist Episcopal Church in the Postwar Era," in
Burke, ed., The History of American Methodism, 2:385.
18 The Boston University Charter read, "No instructor in said University shaI1 ever
be required by the Trustees to profess any particular religious opinions as a test of office ...,
nevertheless, that this section shall not apply to the theological department of said
University" (quoted inKathleen Kilgore, Transformations: A History of Boston University
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The progressive posture of the University is best exemplified in its first
president, William F. Warren.
Having studied at the Universities of Berlin and Halle, Warren was
one of the first Methodists to wrestle with the philosophic tradition of
Leibnitz, Kant and Hegel. He also understood that rather than fearing
German scholarship, American Methodism needed to interact critically with
all that the Continent had to offer in order to adequately respond to the crisis
posed by the emergence of modem science. To supply this need and to train
a generation of intellectually armed Methodist ministers, Warren amassed a
staff of German-trained faculty for the theological department. Those who
received part of their education at Leipzig were Henry Clay Sheldon, who
arrived in 1875 (to teach church history and historical theology), Hinckley
G. Mitchell, in 1884 (biblical studies), and Olin Curtis, in 1889 (systematic
theology)." Bowne, who studied at Paris, Halle, and Gottingen, was added
to the philosophy department in 1876. His tenure eventually resulted in the
birth of the Boston personalist tradition.
(Boston: Boston University Press, 1991], 31). The theological department merged with
Boston Theological Seminary in 1871.
19 For an account of these and other members of the first School of Theology
faculty, see Richard M. Cameron, Boston University School of Theology, 1839-1968
(Boston: Boston University School of Theology, 1968).
CHAPTER III
BOWNE: FROM PIETISM TO EVANGELICAL
LIBERALISM
BIOGRAPHICAL HIGHLIGHTS
Borden Parker was born on 14 January 1847, to Joseph and Margaret
Parker Bowne. 1 One of six children, he grew up in a New Jersey farmhouse
not far from the sea. His father was a morally direct preacher of Puritan
stock, and a champion of abolitionism. As a religious mystic of sorts, his
mother was an avid consumer of the widely circulated devotional, Guide to
Holiness, a periodical which promoted holiness and perfectionist ideas
amongst Methodists in mid-nineteenth century America. Her pietistic leaven
permeated the family home and left an indelible imprint on the young
Bowne. Peter A. Bertocci correctly surmises that these parental influences
left the young Bowne "with a sense of moral tidiness, an enjoyment of
1Although devoted primarily to Bowne's philosophy, Francis J. McConnell's
Borden Parker Bowne (New York: Abingdon Press, 1929) contains detailed biographical
information. My sketch of Bowne's life relies on this work unless otherwise noted.
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nature, and a feeling for religious transcendence that was no flight from
orderly thought, nor from firm moral practice.t"
At seventeen, Bowne left home for Brooklyn and drove a delivery
wagon in preparing himself for further education. He attended Pennington
Seminary for one year, and then entered New York University in 1867
where he received his B.A. as a valedictorian four years later after a fairly
standard humanistic education." This was furthered by a year of study in
Europe (1873-74) and completed with the granting of his M.A. by New
York University in 1876.
Although he was always critical of officialism, Bowne remained a
devoted Methodist throughout his life.4 He joined the New York
Conference ofthe Methodist Episcopal Church in 1872, served a brief
pastorate in the Conference at Whiteside (1872-73), and was ordained ten
2 Peter A. Bertocci, "Borden Parker Bowne and His Personalistic Theistic
Idealism," Ultimate Reality and Meaning 2:3 (1979), reprinted with some alterations in
Deats and Robb, eds., The Boston Personalist Tradition, 55-80; quote from p. 56.
3A transcript listing Bowne's undergraduate curriculum can be found in
McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, 28.
4 Bowne's student, George A. Coe, tell us that it was his "simple loyalty to the
church--loyal to his local society, to the denomination as a whole and the whole church"
which allowed Bowne to be "so uncompromising in his criticisms" ("Borden Parker
Bowne," Methodist Review 93 [July 1910]: 517).
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years later. Bowne's commitment to his denomination is further evidenced
by the fact that he turned down an attractive salary and post at the new
University of Chicago to continue his work at Boston University. His
lifelong piety also found regular expression in his faithful attendance at the
weekly prayer meeting of 81.Mark's Methodist Church in Brookline.
In 1876, after a year on the editorial staff of The Independent (a New
York journal to which he also contributed a number of articles and book
reviews) and a stint as assistant professor of modern languages at New York
University, Bowne was extended the professorship of philosophy by
President Warren.5 He remained in this position for the next thirty four
years, maintaining an indefatigable teaching and writing schedule.t This
was broken only by his year-long world tour beginning in the fall of 1905.
Bowne died abruptly of a heart attack on 1 April 1910, at the age of 63.
sWarren undoubtedly saw in the twenty-nine year old Bowne the promise to fulfill
what he (Warren) had earlier foreseen as an "impending revolution in Anglo-Saxon
theology." In a two-part article written in the early 1860s, Warren surmised that the
change from the mechanical theory of physics to the dynamic theory would necessitate a
similar transition in theology (see Warren's "The Impending Revolution in Anglo-Saxon
Theology," Methodist Review 45 [July 1863]: 455-74 and 579-600). Bowne's life work
would confirm the president's intuition.
6Bowne authored seventeen books and over 150 articles and book reviews
throughout the course of his career, most of them while teaching at least eight course hours
per week.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOWNE'S
PERSONALISTIC THEISTIC IDEALISM
One of Bowne's foremost interpreters, Albert C. Knudson has
observed that "with the revision of hisMetaphysics in 1898 and his Theism
in 1902 Bowne's creative work in philosophy was virtually done. After this
he devoted himself largely to popularizing the conclusions he had reached
and to applying them to the problems of religion.?" Since Bowne's more
strictly theological work in the last decade of his life was drawn from his
philosophical conclusions, it is important that some attention be given first
to his personalistic philosophy.
A fairly descriptive summary of Bowne's philosophy is found in a
letter written toward the end of his life. In it, he wrote,
It is hard to classify me with accuracy. I am a theistic idealist, a
personalist, a transcendental empiricist, an idealist realist, and a
realist idealist; but all these phrases need to be interpreted. They
cannot well be made out from the dictionary. Neither can I well be
called a disciple of anyone. I largely agree with Lotze, but I transcend
him. I hold half of Kant's system but sharply dissent from the rest.
There is a strong smack of Berkeley's philosophy, with a complete
7 Albert C. Knudson, "Bowne as Teacher and Author," The Personalist 1:2 (July
1920): 10. Bowne's Metaphysics was originally published in 1882, and his Theism was a
revision of his Philosophy of Theism (1887) for the occasion of the Deems Lectures at
New York University in 1902.
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rejection of his theory of knowledge. I am a Personalist, the first of
the clan in any thoroughgoing sense."
It is fair to say that Bowne found support for his personalism chiefly from
the three philosophers mentioned here."
In a dissertation completed under Brightman on Bowne's relationship
to the philosopher-cleric Berkeley, Gail Cleland deduces that in all
probability, Bowne became acquainted with and approved of the general
outlines of the Irish Bishop's theistic idealism before his year of studies in
Europe." Bowne, however, objected to Berkeley's doctrine of
thoroughgoing immaterialism, wherein the Irishman denied material
existence and identified being with perception. Also called spiritualism or
subjective idealism, Berkeley held that physical objects were ideas presented
to the human mind and the human perception by God. In contrast to this
view of material reality as but an effect in us, Bowne posited the objective
'Borden Parker Bowne, letter, 31 May 1909, in The Personalist 1 (1921),
reprinted in McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, 280.
91 am indebted at various points in the following account of Bowne's relationship
to Berkeley, Kant, and Lotze to Chapter One of Rufus Burrow, Jr. 's forthcoming
Personalism: A Critical Introductory Exposition.
10 Gail Cleland, "The Relation Between Berkeley and Bowne" (Ph.D. dissertation,
Boston University, 1924), 161. Unfortunately, Bowne referenced other thinkers sparingly
and even then, usually critically. Attempts to discern possible influences on his philosophy
must therefore be partially inferred and thus perhaps tentative in its conclusions.
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existence of things apart from the human mind. II Against Berkeley's "esse
est percipi" ("to be is to be perceived"), Bowne asserted an epistemological
dualism which distinguished between the human knower a~J'the known
object. Thus, by the time his Studies in Theism was submitted for
publication in 1879, he called his system "rational idealism" or "objective
idealism" in contrast to the Bishop's subjective idealism.V
Bowne was probably initially exposed to Kant at about the same time
he was to Berkeley, and engaged with the critical philosophy of the
Koenigsberger all his life. Kant, as is well known, held not only that
knowledge was mediated through sense experience of the phenomenal realm
but also that the structures of knowledge were determined by the human
understanding (or, the categories of the mind). In recognition of the import
of Kant's epistemology as an ally against Berkeley's immaterialism, Bowne
called his system "Kantianized Berkeleianism.v':' He understood Kant's
11 Bowne, however, agreed with Berkeley that nothing existed independently of a'!Y
or all mind, since all phenomenal reality was dependent on the divine mind.
12Borden Parker Bowne, Studies in Theism (Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden,
1880),38 ff. Again, Bowne emphasized that objects of human knowledge existed apart
from human minds, but not independent of a'!Y or all mind-hence his "idealism."
13Borden Parker Bowne, Metaphysics (1882; rev. ed., 1898; reprint ed., Boston:
Boston University Press, 1943), 423; future references to Bowne's Metaphysics will be to
this edition unless otherwise noted.
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doctrine of the activity of the mind in the knowledge process as a valuable
corrective to Berkeley's (and Locke's) theory of the mind as a tabula rasa.
Bowne, however, chided Kant for denying that we can know anything
of the noumenal reality which lay behind the phenomenal world. Unlike
Kant who neglected applying the categories of thought to the Ding an sich,
Bowne insisted that "intelligence cannot be understood through the
categories, but the categories must be understood through our living
experience of intelligence itself." 14 At the very least then, Bowne argued
that the Kantian epistemology led to the recognition of the metaphysical self
as a valid object of knowledge. Therefore, insofar as Kant failed to follow
through with this step, Bowne was prepared to call into question the validity
of the the Kantian doctrine of agnosticism regarding things-in-themselves."
By 1905, then, in discussion with his former student Francis
McConnell, Bowne was considering changing the name of his system to that
of "personalism." Over and against that of "personal idealism," he insisted
14 Ibid., 424-5; thus Bowne also called his system ''transcendental empiricism,"
denoting the "active self-experience of intelligence."
15Bowne argued against this aspect of Kant's philosophy all his life as he rightly
saw that it led ultimately to an agnosticism similar to Spencer's Unknowable. For his most
thorough statement, see his chapter "Noumena and Phenomena" in Kant and Spencer
(Boston and New York: Houghton Mifilin Co., 1912), 109-60.
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-based on a richer notion of personality--on having "the emphasis kept
unmistakably on the personal element.':" This transition may very well be
understood to constitute the combined result of years of reflection which
Bowne had given to metaphysics, his own theistic predisposition, as well as
the influence, in 1874, of his teacher at Gottingen, Rudolf Hermann Lotze
(1817 -81). As with Berkeley, Bowne found in the personalistic elements of
Lotze's theistic idealism confirmation of his own philosophical conclusions.
At the same time, Bowne faulted his teacher for granting, as Kant also
did, more prominence to the categories of thought than to the self. Further,
Lotze's was not a thoroughgoing personalism in that he did not apply the
category of person to God. For Bowne, however, the end result of
philosophical inquiry could be none other than a completed personalistic-
theistic-idealism which he felt was partially obscured in his former teacher. 17
16 Bowne, quoted in Francis J. McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist
Review 105 (May 1922): 342.
17 This may explain Bowne's early acknowledgment of Lotze's influence along with
his later silence regarding the latter. Bowne confesses his obligation to Lotze in Studies in
Theism, vi, and the first edition of hisMetaphysics ([New York: Harper & Brothers,
1882], vii); interestingly, this indebtedness is missing from the preface to the revised edition
even though Bowne says that "for 'substance of doctrine' the teaching is the same"
(Metaphysics, rev. ed., iii).
Cleland, "The Relation Between Bowne and Berkeley," 162, tells us by the
authority of Knudson that "Bowne had worked out the main outline of his philosophy
while in college before he knew anything about Lotze." While 1have not been able to
corroborate this in any of Knudson's writings, Bowne's essays on Spencer in the New
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This profoundly theistic character of Bowne's idealistic philosophy
has led Rufus Burrow, Jr. to liken Bowne to Spinoza as a "God-intoxicated
philosopher." 18 The important question at this juncture therefore is how
Bowne arrived at his theistic conclusion. Although Bowne was raised in a
pietistic Christian home, his mature theism was not a sentimental construct,
but rather, for the most part, the result of rigorous philosophic reasoning. 19
It is fortunate for us that Bowne clearly delineated his philosophic method in
two places: an early essay, "The Logic of Religious Belief' (1879), and later,
in the introductory chapter to his Theism.
Bowne's essay focused on what he called at the time the "psychology
ofbelief.,,20 Religious belief, Bowne argued, differed from scientific or
Englander in 1872-73 (revised and published as The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer in
1874) appear to provide ample confirmation of this statement.
1"Rufus Burrow, Jr., "Borden Parker Bowne's Doctrine of God," Encounter 53:4
(Autumn 1992): 397; Burrow is simply pointing to Bowne's encompassing theism and not
at all suggesting that Bowne's is a pantheism like Spinoza's. McConnell, Borden Parker
Bowne, 76-77, preserves an interesting illustration of this point when he reports on how
Bowne's contemporary at Harvard, William James, would when presenting an alternative
theistic perspective on a philosophical issue during the course of his lectures, refer to one
of Bowne's volumes in hand and declare, "Now lets see what God Almighty has to say."
19 I will later raise the question of whether or not Bowne was fully consistent in
applying the principles of personalism to his theism.
20 Borden Parker Bowne, "The Logic of Religious Belief," Methodist Review 61
(1879), reprinted in Representative Essays of Borden Parker Bowne, ed. Warren E.
Steinkraus (Utica NY: Meridian Publishing Company, n.d.), 152. In a later book, Bowne
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logical belief. Science and mathematics, for example, required that "nothing
may be believed which is not proved, or at least made probable, by objective
facts." In contrast, religion followed what Bowne called the "law ofthe
mind." This law was none other than our guide to life: "Whatever the mind
demands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be
assumed as real, in default of positive proof. ,,21 Bowne concluded that "the
principles of mental movement are to be sought, not in logic, but in life.,,22
Ai; such, Bowne had in essence adjudicated the religious question by a sort
of pragmatism.
Bowne's "pragmatism" was similar to that articulated later by
William James. James himself acknowledged this in a letter to Bowne after
reading the latter's Personalism: " ... our emphatic footsteps fall on the
same spot. You, starting near the rationalist pole, and boxing the compass,
and I traversing the diameter from the empiricist pole, reach practically very
similar positions and attitudes. It seems to me that this is full of promise for
dealt at length on the psychology of mind itself; see Introduction to Psychological Theory
(New York: American Book Company/Harper & Brothers, 1886).
21 Bowne, "The Logic of Religious Belief, fl 156.
22 Ibid., 161.
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the future of'philosophy.v'" While one student of Bowne's thought has
argued cogently that James was Bowne's "most direct and decisive
pragmatic influence," it should be noted that James laid greater emphasis on
the will to believe, whereas Bowne focused more on the rationale behind
that will."
This method was developed and refined over the years. By the time
Bowne prepared his Theism for publication in 1902, he was able to sum up
his approach in the following sentences:
. . . most of our time will be devoted to discussing the question of
intelligence versus non-intelligence. The idea of God may be treated
from a double standpoint, metaphysical and religious. In the former,
God appears as the principle of knowing and explanation. In the
latter, he is the implication of the religious consciousness, or that
without which that consciousness would fall into discord with itself.25
Loosely defined, this was a four-pronged argument for theism--from
intelligence, epistemology, metaphysics and religious consciousness--which .
23William James to Bowne, 17 August 1908, in McConnell, Borden Parker
Bowne, 278; italics James'.
24 Edward T. Ramsdell, "The Sources of Bowne's Pragmatism," The Personalist
16 (Summer 1935): 133 if. For more detailed comparisons, see Wilbur Long, "The
Religious Philosophy of Bowne and James," The Personalist 5 (1924): 250-63, and
Herbert Schneider's introductory essay, "Bowne's Radical Empiricism," in Steinkraus, ed.,
Representative Essays of Borden Parker Bowne, xi-xv
2' Borden Parker Bowne, Theism (New York and Cincinnati: American Book
Company, 1902), 39.
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can be seen in all of Bowne's philosophical publications. A brief review of
these arguments will shed light on the final form of Bowne's personalism.
The crux of Bowne's theistic arguments turned on the question of
whether or not the world could be better explained by the appeal to
intelligence (idealism) or to non-intelligence (materialism), since there could
be no "third something higher than either, and transcendental to both.,,26
There was therefore no contest between theistic and non-theistic systems of
philosophy-whether they be nihilistic skepticism, agnosticism, mechanistic
naturalism, materialism, or atheism, against all of which Bowne waged a
lifelong battle--since it was all too obvious to him that "the non-intelligent
does not explain the intelligent.t''" Thus, for example, while Darwinism had
bequeathed to Bowne's generation the general conception of the "organic
connection and unity in the world ofliving things," yet, this connection and
unity "must be found not in the space and time world, where everything is
outside of every other, but rather in the world of thought, where alone things
26 Borden Parker Bowne, Philosophy of Theism (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1887),27.
"Bowne, Studies in Theism, 168.
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are truly united in one systematic whole.?" Here, of course, one can discern
Bowne's own modified version of the traditional cosmological and
teleological arguments, combining elements of design and purpose found in
the universe.
Closely related to this was the epistemological argument. Skeptics
such as Spencer and his American disciple, John Fiske, were invariably
targets of Bowne's polemical criticism." Via his epistemological dualism--
that objects of human knowledge exist independently of human minds--
Bowne defined "knowledge" as "the certainty that our conceptions
correspond to reality or to truth. By reality, we mean any matter of fact,
whether of the outer or inner world. By truth, we mean rational
principles.'?" On the one hand, to deny the possibility of attaining reality
would ultimately lead to solipsism, a generally anathematized conclusion
"Borden Parker Bowne, "Darwin and Darwinism," The Hibbert Journal 8 (1909-
10): 138.
29 A condensed version of the argument in the two books Bowne wrote refuting
Spencer can be found in his "Mr. Spencer's Philosophy," Methodist Review 86 (July
1904): 513-31. On Bowne's repudiation of Fiske's Outlines of the Cosmic Philosophy
(1874), see his early review article, "The Cosmic Philosophy," Methodist Quarterly
Review 58 (1876): 655-78.
JOBowne, Studies in Theism, 13-14; Bowne discusses the matter extensively in
Theory of Thought and Knowledge (New York and London: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1899), 267 if.
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among philosophers. On the other, to reject the notion of truth altogether
would be to abandon the scientific quest since it was clear to Bowne that
"the possibility of objective science depends on the assumption of perfect
parallelism between the rational and the real, between mind working
according to its law and things working according to their laws.,,31 For
Bowne, therefore, "the cognitive ideal of the universe, as a manifestation of
the Supreme Reason, leads to theism.,,32
Bowne devoted an entire volume to the discussion of metaphysics. In
it, he argued from the notion of being, the nature of things, change and
identity, and causality, to God.33 Bowne explained the antithesis between
being and becoming by reconceiving being as action:
Action is a dynamic consequence of being, and is coexistent with it.
Neither can be thought without the other, and neither was before the
other. Being did not first exist, and then act; neither did it act before it
existed; but both being and action are given in indissoluble unity.
31 Bowne, Studies in Theism, 133.
31Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, 264. Bowne never relinquished the
epistemological argument, as seen in an essay dictated to his stenographer two days before
his death: "The problem of knowledge implies that nature is a world of meanings, and this
implies thought at both ends--thought at the further end to make nature the bearer of
meanings, and thought at the nearer end to receive and rethink the meanings" ("Present
Status of the Conflict of Faith," Methodist Review 105 [May 1922]: 369).
33 Bowne, Metaphysics, Part 1, Chapters I-IV.
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Being has its existence only in its action, and the action is possible
only through the being."
Nature was thus constituted by this law of activity. Further, only conscious
intelligence could resolve the antinomy between permanence and change;
this, Bowne was prepared to call the personal soul, whose permanence
consisted "in thought, memory, and self-consciousness.v" Itwas also in
this same "self-determining intelligence" that Bowne found the explanatory
key to the concept of causality: "Volitional causality, that is, intelligence
itself in act, is the only conception of metaphysical causality in which we can
rest. ,,36
These inquiries led Bowne to conclude that "active intelligence cannot
be understood through the metaphysical categories, but these categories
must be understood as realized in active intelligence.v" The evidence thus
pointed to a fundamental cosmic reality which Bowne identified as the
World-Ground. By this, Bowne spoke not of "spatial support [nor] a raw






which the world is produced and maintained.v'" Bowne challenged the
opponents of idealism to look beyond the phenomenal world. Phenomena
are "real," albeit dependent on and revealing of a deeper abiding reality.
"Materiality is but the phenomenal product of a dynamism beneath it,,,39
and this dynamism is none other than the World-Ground. As a unity, the
World-Ground therefore points away from a cosmic dualism (or pluralism--
whether in terms of polytheism or atomism) towards an ontological monism,
and it is only within such a reality that a viable pluralism (e.g., human
individuality and freedom) can subsist.
Finally, Bowne called on the religious consciousness of the race as a
witness to the fact that "religion is founded in human nature as one of its
essential needs and constitutional tendencies.'?" So deeply embedded
within the human experience is religion that efforts to exorcise it have not
succeeded. Bowne, however, was careful not to claim following either this
or the totality of his argument that theism was proven. Rather, he followed
his philosophic method and asserted that "theism is the fundamental
38 Ibid., 93.
39 Ibid., 18.
40 Bowne, Theism, 9.
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postulate of our total life. It cannot, indeed, be demonstrated without
assumption, but it cannot be denied without wrecking all our interests.'?"
Further, "in these matters it is never a question of finding a line of no
resistance for thought, but the line ofleast resistance.,,42 Itwas, for Bowne,
theism which followed the latter since it provided the most satisfactory
solutions to many of the knotty problems posed by philosophy as well as
life's experiences.
Both Philosophy a/Theism and Theism were expositions of Bowne's
doctrine of the World-Ground. In the Preface to the latter book, Bowne
captures fully the essentials of his theistic philosophy in a pregnant
paragraph which deserves to be recited:
And as epistemology reveals the suicidal nature of atheistic thought,
so metaphysical criticism shows the baselessness of its metaphysics.
The crude realism of popular thought, when joined with the notion of
mechanical necessity, furnishes excellent soil for an atheistic growth.
This realism in its popular form may be regarded as finally set aside,
and also the mechanical naturalism based on it. Philosophy is coming
to see the emptiness of all philosophizing on the mechanical and
impersonal plane; so that the choice for both science and philosophy is
either a theistic foundation or none. Both the abstractions of
mechanical theory and the impersonal categories of philosophical
dogmatism are found to cancel themselves when taken apart from
41 Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, iv.
42 Bowne, Theism, 42.
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living and self-conscious intelligence, in which alone they have either
existence or meaning."
Life demonstrated intelligence in the universe, and all of this demanded
explanation. Against the non-theistic, impersonal philosophies which he had
repudiated, Bowne opted for his personalistic theism." His philosophic
method led him there, and did not allow otherwise.
After 1905 (as noted above) Bowne preferred "Supreme Person" over
"World-Ground." In his classic text, Personalism, he defined "personality"
as "selfhood, self-consciousness, self-control, and the power to know.,,45
The traditional conundrums of philosophy--unity and plurality, change and
identity, causality, phenomenality and reality, and the finite and the infinite--
could be resolved only if personality were posited as the fundamental
metaphysical principle of reality. As he summarized in hisMetaphysics,
... the notion of the impersonal finite vanishes, upon analysis, into
phenomenality, In seeking for identity, we found it only in the
personal, In seeking for causality, we found it only in the personal,
In studying interaction, we found that the causality of the finite
cannot extend beyond its own subjectivity, and the impersonal has no
"!b·d .1 _, "1.
44 See Bowne's famous chapter, "The Failure ofImpersonalism" in Personalism
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1908).
"Ibid., 266. In Theism, 162, Bowne understood the essence of personality as
"selfhood, self-knowledge, and self-direction."
44
subjectivity. On all these accounts, we must hold the impersonal is
possible only as dependent phenomenon, or process of an energy not
its own. Only selfhood serves to mark off the finite as substantial
I· 46rea tty....
Given the centrality of personality in his system, it is appropriate to
acknowledge Bowne as the "Father of American personalism."
When we notice, however, that even in the 1870s Bowne was already
placing emphasis on the "divine will and purpose" and declaring that "full
personality exists only where the nature is transparent to self; and where all
the powers are under absolute control ... [belonging] only to the infinite.?"
we can see that while his terminology had changed, the contours of his
personalistic theism had long been settled. But it was not until the last
decade of his life that Bowne began applying his personalism to the
questions of religion and theology in a more sustained manner.
BOWNE'S "GAINS FOR RELIGIOUS THOUGHT..."
Having briefly reviewed the highlights of Bowne's personalistic
theism, we are now much better equipped to assess his contributions to
46 Bowne, Metaphysics, 99.
47 Bowne, Studies in Theism, 324, 275.
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Methodist theology." Since Bowne's theological liberalism needs to be
understood within the context of his conservative orthodoxy, I will begin
by looking at the latter.
Although progressive with regard to non-essentials of the faith, Bowne
was in thorough agreement with the cardinal doctrines of Christianity." As
a youngster, Bowne was "saturated" in the Bible,50 and in a very real sense,
his vision for the Christian life was representative of the evangelical pietism
found in the Methodist church at the tum of the twentieth century. He
defended, for example, the classical attributes of God such as immutability,
omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence, the validity of miracles, and
the belief in personal immortality. 51 His orthodoxy was practically
••Bowne's theology has been systematically examined both by William H.
Bernhardt, "The Influence of Borden Parker Bowne upon Theological Thought in the
Methodist Episcopal Church" (see Chapter I, note 3), and Frederick Thomas Trotter, "The
Christian Theology of Borden Parker Bowne" (ph.D. dissertation, Boston University,
1958). My task will be the more modest one of seeking to trace the trajectory of Bowne's
personalism within the larger framework of the era of theological liberalism within the
Methodist church.
""Here, of course, Bowne was simply following the founder of Methodism who
was tolerant of differing opinions as regard non-essential doctrines; see Umphrey Lee,
"Freedom from Rigid Creed," Methodism, ed. William K. Anderson (Cincinnati: The
Methodist Publishing House, 1947), 128-38.
50 Kate M. Bowne, "An Intimate Portrait of Bowne," The Personalist 2: 1 (January
1921): 7.
" On Bowne's adherence to the absolutistic tenets of classical theism, see Chapter
IV of Theism, titled "The Metaphysical Attributes of the World-Ground." With regard to
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unimpeachable as seen in a "doctrinal statement" which he drew toward the
end of his life: "I believe in God the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ his
Son our Lord. I believe in the Holy Spirit, in the forgiveness of sins, in the
kingdom of God on earth, and in the life everlasting.vf This was centered
in the person of Jesus Christ.
In his christology, Bowne refused to follow the lead ofliberal biblical
scholarship which, under the strain of historicism, separated the Jesus of
history from the Christ of faith. For Bowne, the latter was not just an
afterthought created by the early Christian community, but was rather
integrally connected with the former." In a sermon titled "The Supremacy
of Christ," he asserted the superiority of Christianity. Christ is also the basis
of an optimistic view of history. Further, he is the center and completion of
biblical revelation, the chief source of personal inspiration, and finally, the
miracles, Bowne rejected the thaumaturgic, yet defended the Incamation and resurrection
of Christ; see his synoptic article, "Concerning Miracle, " Harvard Theological Review 3:2
(April 1910): 143-66. On his apologetic for personal immortality, see "Present Status of
the Argument for Life After Death," North American Review 191 (1910): 96-104.
32 Borden Parker Bowne, Studies in Christianity (Boston: Houghton Miffiin
Company, 1909), 372-3; the first three chapters in this volume on revelation, the
incarnation and atonement, and the Christian life, are revisions of three of Bowne's earlier
books.
53 See Bowne's apology in "Jesus or Christ?" Methodist Review 92 (March 1910):
177-93. McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne": 344, tells us that Bowne held to a "stiff
kenotic Christology," believing in the preexistence of Christ as the Son of God.
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supreme motivator to social regeneration. 54
Bowne sincerely vouched for the validity of religious experience. He
held that personal religion was the ideal of religious development. 55 As
further indication of his personal piety, Bowne preached, for example, that
"the life of prayer is the only thing that gives prayer any meaning.t'" His
more restrained form of pietism, however, can be seen as a reaction to the
emotionalism that pervaded some revivalistic circles of American
Methodism. Critical of its excesses, Bowne cautioned against dogmatic
theologizing about spiritual experiences. Thus, in discussing the Wesleyan
concept of "the witness ofthe Spirit," he insisted on distinguishing between
the doctrine "as a truth of theology and as a fact of consciousness," and
warned that failure to do so would lead to "doubtful exegesis and into
theological and metaphysical speculations." 57
54 Borden Parker Bowne, "The Supremacy of Christ," Methodist Review 92
(November 1910): 881-89, reprinted in a book of sermons published posthumously, The
Essence a/Religion (Boston: Houghton Mift1in Company, 1910), 1-22. No more vibrant
testimony to Bowne's evangelical pietism appears than in this collection of sermons.
55 Borden Parker Bowne, The Christian Life (Cincinnati: Jennings & Pye, 1899),
142 tf.
56 From Bowne's sermon on "Prayer" in The Essence a/Religion, 159.
57Bowne, The Christian Life, 80, 87. For Wesley, the "witness of the Spirit" was
the inner assurance believers received which confirmed their salvation. Wesley himself
understood his "heart-warming" Aldersgate experience in this way. Various interpretations
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Bowne's meliorism (a corollary doctrine of his cosmic monism--the
World-Ground as a unity) allowed him to take both individual and social
regeneration seriously. 58 He thus believed that the Kingdom of God found
concrete expression in the world-in government, industry, justice, the arts,
hospitals, schools, the sciences, and economics--and that redemption was for
both the individual as well as society. He insisted that central to Christianity
is "life, large, full, and abundant, lived, however, in the filial spirit ....
Forgiveness of sins is essential but it is only introductory. ,,59
In all of this, the pietistic and social evangelicalism of nineteenth
century American Methodism is clearly demonstrated. Bowne's loyalty to
were posited by later Methodist theologians in an effort to explicate this doctrine, including
dogmatic speculations regarding the nature of the experience which Bowne rejected. In
discussing this dimension of Bowne's life and thought, McConnell notes that the former
"did not object to thrills, but he wanted ethical and spiritual content above all" ("Borden
Parker Bowne": 348).
" Regarding his meliorism, Bowne wrote that "neither a finished optimism nor a
final pessimism is warranted by knowledge; but experience shows the possibility of
indefinite meliorism, and with this for the present we must be content" (Theism, 282); the
influence of the doctrine of evolution on Bowne's liberalism is here evident.
59 Bowne, Studies in Christianity, 320. Later in this same book, Bowne affirms
that the aim of religion is not only to motivate prayer, church attendance and spiritual
activity, but to "make men conscious of the divine will and presence in life, until the world
shall become God's temple, in which men perpetually offer up the daily life, with all its
interests and activities pervaded and sanctified by the filial spirit, as their spiritual worship
of God" (Chapter V, "The Church and Moral Progress," 344-45). Bowne more fully
addressed various social issues in The Principles of Ethics (New York: American Book
Company, 1892), 247-303.
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his church was never in doubt, even when under the fire of a trial for heresy.
The following, written in 1899, summarizes his evangelical piety: " ... our
sole duty is to proclaim the forgiveness of sins, to call the prodigals home to
the Father's house, and to bring up the children to be sons and daughters of
the Lord Almighty. All beyond this is theology, and is of no practical
moment.t''"
Against this background, Bowne's liberalism would appear to be
rather tame. While this may be true, it is undoubted that Bowne exercised
a tremendous liberating influence on his church in theological matters.
One student has testified to the salvific nature of Bowne's work as follows:
By the study of the philosophy of Doctor Bowne ... , he [the author]
has obtained the abiding conviction that changing beliefs are the
progressive and temporal embodiment of the eternal. He has come to
view the world from the theistic angle, and come to see that after the
worst is spoken, theism is more reasonable than atheism, and that
religion is the deepest instinct of man. 6]
The following examines more specifically Bowne's liberal contributions to
Methodist theology.
As seen above, Bowne drew two conclusions from his ventures in
6OBowne, The Christian Life, 141.
61 Charles Bertram Pyle, The Philosophy of Borden Parker Bowne and Its
Application to the Religious Problem (Columbus OH: S. F. Harriman, 1910), 5-6.
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philosophical theology: the World-Ground is the Supreme Person, and the
phenomenal universe exists in dependence on God. This led to the central
pillar of Bowne's evangelical liberalism: the Fatherhood of God and the
corollary doctrine of the divine immanence in the world.
The doctrine of the Fatherhood of God was Bowne's decidedly
Christian formulation to what he had, in Theism, discussed in a chapter
titled "God and the World." In this chapter, Bowne emphasized God as
creator, sustainer, and goal of the world.62 When translated into theology,
this led away from the traditional (Augustinian-Calvinistic) view of God as
judge and the emphasis on divine retribution to the belief in God as loving
father and the related doctrine of the "brotherhood ofhumankind.,,63 As a
result, God is no longer understood as a transcendant magistrate, but rather
as one to whom we are personally related.
In his The Immanence of God, Bowne developed this doctrine in
detail. He described "divine immanence" as the view
that God is the omnipresent ground of all finite existence and activity.
The world, alike of things and of spirits, is nothing existing and acting
on its own account, while God is away in some extra-sidereal region,
62Bowne, Theism, 226 if.
6J Bowne, Studies in Christianity, 218; The Christian Lift, 36.
51
but it continually depends upon and is ever upheld by the ever-living,
ever-present, ever-working God.64
With this doctrine, the antithesis between the natural and the supernatural is
thus dissolved. As Bowne put it,
in the new conception, the supernatural is nothing foreign to nature
... but insofar as nature as a whole is concerned, the supernatural
is the ever-present ground and administrator of nature; and nature is
simply the form under which the Supreme Reason and Will manifest
themselves.f
Similarly, with regard to history, Bowne shifted the emphasis from divine
government to divine family: "God works his will in history not apart from
men, but through men and in partnership with them; and the work is no less
divine on that account. ,,66 The end result is that religion is purged from
"that great cloud of difficulties, born of crude materialism;" further, the
doctrine of divine immanence recalls God
64Borden Parker Bowne, The Immanence of God (Boston and New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1905),3.
65 Ibid., 17; later in the book, Bowne turned his guns on cosmic dualism and
insisted that "the term 'supernatural' should be abandoned because of its misleading
associations" (ibid., 150). He had earlier written that "God's immanence in the law [of the
world] renders unnecessary any interference from a realm beyond the law" (Theism, 239);
See also Bowne's discussion of the continuity of nature inMetaphysics, 263 ff., and his
essay, "Natural and Supernatural," Methodist Review 113 (1895), reprinted in
Representative Essays of Borden Parker Bowne, 37-46.
66Bowne, The Immanence of God, 65.
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from the infinite distance in space and time to which sense thought
must banish him, and where we so often lose him, and makes him the
omnipresent power by which all things exist and on which all things
continually depend."
Thus, to use the Pauline phrase which Bowne was fond of quoting, in God
"we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28).
Two other doctrines which Bowne briefly touched upon were that
concerning revelation and the atonement. His personalistic method can be
seen in each.
Bowne refused to draw a static equation between the Christian
revelation and the Bible just as he did not agree that its inspiration was
dependent on the doctrine of dictation. The latter theory which held that the
words of Scripture were dictated by God to the biblical authors was, he
maintained, the result of the "picture thinking" of popular common sense.
Instead, Bowne preferred to understand the Christian revelation dynamically
as God's self-disclosure.68 This revelation was completed and objectively
manifested in the person of Jesus Christ, 69 and not, he was careful to insist,
67 Ibid., 151.
68 Bowne, Studies in Christianity, 6 ff.
69Ibid., 77.
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in dogmatic christological speculation. This doctrine of revelation therefore
concerned the supreme person of God and the Christ, and thus resisted the
tendency to abstract bibliolatry.
Likewise, with the doctrine of the atonement Bowne warned about
distinguishing "between the Christian fact and the theological theory.':" In
place of the traditional theories, Bowne followed the liberals of his time
in advocating the Subjective View or Moral Influence understanding of the
atonement. In this scheme, Bowne sought to understand "the Savior's work
by the principles and analogies of the ethical realm, rather than by those of
the governmental and juristic realm."?' Thus, the traditional doctrine of
salvation was understood in personal terms, in that the deliverance was not
just from the penalties of sin, but from sin itself, the end result was the call
to discipleship.f
70 Borden Parker Bowne, The Atonement (Cincinnati: Jennings and Pye, 1900), 3.
By "theological theory," Bowne probably had in mind such treatises as The Atonement in
Christ (1879) by the respected Methodist theologian, John Miley. Infact, as can be seen
from the above discussion, Bowne also objected to the "governmental theory" --the
atonement understood within the scheme of divine justice--set forth in Miley's book, and
countered it with his own view of the "divine family."
71 Bowne, The Atonement, 118
72 Ibid., 152; here, as elsewhere, Bowne's "pragmatism" is clearly in evidence:
"With this practical discipleship we shall receive all the benefits of the Savior's work
without any theory; and without this discipleship we are lost, whatever the theory" (Studies
in Christianity, 193).
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Bowne's estimation of his contributions to the development of
Methodist theology can be seen in an essay he published shortly before his
death. In "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation," 73 he
argued that the struggle to reconcile science and religion which was of
preeminent concern early in his career was resolved by the conception of
"adequate philosophical equipment" --including his own personalistic theistic
idealism. Philosophically, crude naturalism had given way to a personalistic
monism. Theologically, the Christian God of word and deed, intellect and
will, can be understood as the "one supreme and all-embracing causality of
which the physical order is but the continuous manifestation.?" Religiously,
spirituality is revitalized to reclaim the totality of life via a personalistic
pragmatism. The venue of debate has been changed "from the court of logic
and speculation to the court of life, action, and history.?"
73 Borden Parker Bowne, "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation,"





SUMMARY OF BOWNE'S ROLE IN METHODISM'S
CONFRONTATION WITH MODERNITY
Bowne's theology was premised on his personalism, which combined
metaphysical idealism and ontological monism. His idealism posited mind
and intelligence as the ground of the cosmos. His monism (which he
opposed to both cosmic dualism and polytheism) secured a meliorism which
allowed for a this-worldly emphasis. Wedded to his personalism Bowne
was thus able to maintain with vigor the personal nature of the Christian
God. Further, against the static theologies resulting from the influence of
deism (in the seventeenth century) and mechanical realism, he reinterpreted
Methodist theology along more dynamic and personalistic lines.
Because of his liberalism, Bowne had for years championed the
integrity of the scholarly process. Bowne's commitment to academic
freedom can be seen in his advocacy on behalf of his colleague in the Bible
department at Boston University, Hinckley G. Mitchell. The orthodoxy of
Mitchell, the Professor of Old Testament who studied at Leipzig under the
renowned German orientalist, Franz 1. Delitzsch (1813-90), was repeatedly
questioned from 1895-1905 because of his erudition in matters pertaining to
the higher criticism of Scripture. His use of this philological method led, for
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example, to his denying the import of a literal reading of the early chapters
of the book of Genesis. Mitchell was finally dismissed from his position by
the Bishops of the Conference in 1905.76
By allying with Mitchell, however, Bowne opened up his own views to
increasing scrutiny by the conservative faction of the Conference. This
culminated in his heresy trial in the spring of 1904. Of the five charges
brought against him-regarding his views on the Trinity, miracles, the
atonement, immortality, and soteriology-Bowne was convicted on none and
completely exonerated of all. 77 With this acquittal, it was generally agreed
that the new theology had gained acceptance within the Methodist church."
From his position at Boston University, Bowne exerted an important
7. For an autobiographical account of this affair, see Mitchell's For the Benefit of
My Creditors (Boston: Beacon Press, 1922). Bowne was not Mitchell's only advocate.
President Warren also supported Mitchell's scholarship, although he tended to be more
conservative in his conclusions than the Old Testament professor; see Warren's "Current
Biblical Discussions-The Proper Attitude of Theological Faculties with Respect to Them,"
Methodist Review 81 (May 1899): 368-81.
77The most complete account of the trial which Ihave been able to find is "The
Orthodoxy of Bowne," collated by the editor of the Methodist Review 105 (May 1922):
399-413; this is also reprinted in McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, 189-201.
78 The religious periodicals reported that by this action, "the Methodist Church, as
represented in this Conference at least, declares that it regards sound logic, acute reasoning,
and profound scholarship as entirely compatible with piety and spirituality, and even as aids
to growth in the religious life" ("Echoes of the Trial and Acquittal of Professor Bowne,"
The Christian Advocate 79 [28 April 1904]: 657, quoting The New York Observer, an
organ of conservative Presbyterian orthodoxy).
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influence upon American higher education. Edgar S. Brightman tells us that
while at Boston,
... every student in the College was required to study under Bowne;
and substantially every student in the School of Theology elected to do
so. From 1888 to 1910, he was Dean of the Graduate School and a
good proportion of the advanced degrees conferred by the University
were for work done in philosophy under him."
Besides those who studied under Bowne at Boston, William H. Bernhardt
notes that by the 1920s, over 57 percent of the ministers in the Methodist
Episcopal Church received their theological training through the Conference
Course of Study. The texts in the doctrinal portion of this Course included,
among its five books, Bowne's Studies in Christianity, Sheldon's System of
Christian Doctrine (1903), and Francis L. Strickland's Foundations of
Christian Belief(l915). Both Sheldon (as colleague) and Strickland (as
student whose Ph.D. under Bowne was conferred in 1903) were heavily
influenced by Bowne. Bernhardt concludes that Bowne's influence "on the
method and content ofthe theology ofthe Methodist Episcopal Church is
being felt in more than half of the pulpits of this church.?"
19Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne,"
Proceedings a/the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, ed. E. S. Brightman
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927), 164.
BOBernhardt, "The Influence of Borden Parker Bowne," 242, 243, 254 (emphasis
mine). For a later assessment, see F. Thomas Trotter, "Borden Parker Bowne, 1847-1910:
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In spite of his various theological writings and his influence in
American Methodist theology, it should not be forgotten that Bowne was a
philosophy professor and considered himself first and foremost as a
philosopher. Such being the case, he has been nominated by one writer as
the most deserving to receive the title of "philosopher of American
Protestantism. "SI His philosophy of personalism had enabled American
Methodism to move theologically from its evangelical pietism toward an
evangelical liberalism. It remained for one of his stndents, Albert C.
Knudson, to apply systematically the principles of Bowne's personalism
toward developing an evangelically liberal, Methodist, theology.
An Estimate of His Contribution and Continuing Influence," The Philosophical Forum 18
(1960-61 ):51-8.
It is fascinating to note that Bowne's influence can just as well be measured
negatively. With the rise of the Fundamentalist movement in the middle-war period, a
conservative reaction developed within American Methodism which contingent included a
theologian and a pastor who both took issue specifically with Bowne's religious and
theological writings; see John Faulkner, Modernism and the Christian Faith (New York:
Methodist Book Concern, 1921),68 ff., and Harold Paul Sloan, Historic Christianity and
the New Theology (Louisville KY: Pentecostal Publishing House, 1922), 36-67.
81 Albert Cornelius Knudson, "Bowne in American Theological Education," The
Personalist 28 (1947): 256.
CHAPTER IV
KNUDSON: AN EVANGELICAL LIBERAL IN
METHODIST THEOLOGY
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
On 23 January 1873, Asle and Susan Knudson had their fourth of
nine children.' Growing up in a pastor's home in Grandmeadow,
Minnesota, prepared their son, Albert Cornelius Knudson, for a lifetime of
service in the Methodist church. The love for the Scriptures which the
parents instilled in Albert was such that by the age of fifteen, he had read
through all five volumes of Adam Clarke's Commentary on the Pentateuch.2
Knudson entered the University of Minnesota the next year. He began
his philosophical studies in earnest during his junior year, being influenced,
I I am indebted in this section primarily to Elmer A. Leslie, "Albert Cornelius
Knudson, The Man," Personalism in Theology: A Symposium in Honor of Albert
Cornelius Knudson, ed. E. S. Brightman (Boston: Boston University Press, 1943; reprint
ed., New York: AMS Press, 1979), 1-20.
2Ibid., 4; one of Wesley's appointed circuit rider preachers, Adam Clarke (1762-
1832) was Methodism's most respected commentator and theologian in the nineteenth
century.
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among other books, by Royce's The Spirit of Modem Philosophy? After
receiving his B.A. in 1893, Knudson was encouraged by his pastor (a former
student of Bowne) to study further at Boston. Knudson finished his S.T.B.
(Bachelor of Sacred Theology) in 1896, but still philosophically unsatisfied,
spent the next year under Bowne's tutelage." He later described this
experience as a "veritable Aufklarung":
What Bowne did for me was first to clarify the field of thought, to
mark out its great highways, and to show where each led. Then he
laid bare with extraordinary lucidity the grounds offaith, and gave me
an insight into the conditions of a sound metaphysic that has guided
me in all my subsequent thinking .... It brought me a mental relief
and an intellectual illumination that may be described as akin to a
redemptive experience.'
3By the time of its publication in 1892, the main outlines of Royce's absolute
idealism had already been formed,
4 For his S.T.B., Knudson studied Old Testament under Hinckley Mitchell, Church
history and historical theology under Henry Sheldon, and systematic theology under Olin
Curtis. During the 18808, both Sheldon and Curtis were still laboring under what William
H. Bernhardt calls "modified orthodoxy" (reflecting the more conservative views of
nineteenth century Methodism) while being influenced by the implications of Bowne's
philosophy on theological method ("The Influence of Borden Parker Bowne," 15 ff).
Sheldon's gradual transition to a position substantially that of Bowne's can be seen in the
former's System of Christian Doctrine published in 1903. By 1905, Curtis was also ready
to be explicit in acknowledging his indebtedness to Bowne's personalism (see Curtis' The
Christian Faith Personally Given in a System of Doctrine [1905; reprint, Grand Rapids,
MI: Kregel Publications, 1956], x), This explains in part Knudson's dissatisfaction with
the course of study for his S.T.B. and his decision to study further directly with Bowne.
S Albert Cornelius Knudson, "A Personalistic Approach to Theology,"
Contemporary American Theology, vol. 1, ed. Vergilius Ferro (New York: Round Table
Press, Inc., 1932), 223.
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Knudson followed this with studies in 1897-98 at Jena and Berlin under
such noted Ritschlian liberals as the Church historian, Adolfvon Harnack
(1851-1930), and the theologian, Julius Kaftan (1848-1926).6
Upon his return to the States, Knudson began his teaching career as
Professor of Church History at Iliff School of Theology in Denver, Colorado.
This was followed by two other brief stints (as Professor of Philosophy at
Baker University and Thoburn Professor of English Bible and Philosophy at
Allegheny College) before he received a call from his alma mater in
December, 1905.
Knudson accepted the challenge of filling the position vacated by the
dismissal of his former Old Testament teacher, Hinckley Mitchell, and after
an intense period of preparation during which he read the entire Old
Testament in the original language, began teaching at Boston officially in the
fall of 1906. Although he was invited in 1911 to Bowne's professorship of
philosophy after the latter's death, he declined partly in order to complete his
work in the field of Old Testament which had now occupied his energies for
five years. He later agreed to succeed Henry Sheldon as Professor of
•He was conferred an honorary Doctor of Theology by the University of Berlin in
December, 1923.
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Systematic Theology, and did so after the latter's retirement in 1921.
Far from being only an academician, however, Knudson was also a
very involved administrator and churchman throughout his career. In 1926
he began a twelve year term as Dean of the School of Theology. During the
1930s, he was a faithful participant at ecclesiastical Conferences;' as well as
a regular worshipper at the Epworth Methodist Church in Cambridge
throughout his life. Due to ill health, he resigned from his Deanship and
took a sabbatical leave in 1937. He continued teaching, however, until
1943, and writing up to the final years before his death on 28 August 1953.
KNUDSON AND THE ADYANCE OF LIBERALISM
IN BIBLICAL STIJDIES
Knudson tells us that during his studies under Bowne, he "formed the
purpose of rethinking Christian theology in the light of the philosophy that I
had found so significant in my own thought life."s Although he did not
begin to focus his.energies directly on this task until he began his duties as
7In a separate essay, Leslie briefly discusses Knudson's involvement at the 1932
and 1936 General Conferences, the 1937 Edinburgh Conference on Faith and Order, and
the 1939 Methodist Unification Conference which saw a merger of three large Methodist
bodies into The Methodist Church ("Albert Cornelius Knudson: An Intimate View," The
Personalist 35:4 [October 1954]: 361-62).
•Knudson, "A Personalistic Approach to Theology," 224.
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Professor of Systematic Theology in 1921, the work in biblical studies which
he did as Professor of Old Testament laid a solid foundation for this task. It
is therefore of some import to now focus on the achievements of Knudson's
evangelical liberalism in the field of biblical studies.
In succeeding the controversial Mitchell, Knudson was well aware of
the antagonism which conservatives harbored against the methods of
modern biblical scholarship. When added to the rise of Fundamentalism
during the early part of this century, Knudson saw that an evangelical
liberal theology of Scripture was urgently needed. Such a view would not
only have to remain within the Wesleyan exegetical tradition, but also satisfy
the critical inquiries of the modern mind. As he saw it early in his career,
the problem with the Bible as a whole (and the Old Testament specifically),
was how its religious values could be commended to the modern Christian
consciousness. He attempts in his first book, occasioned by his inauguration
as Professor of Old Testament at Boston University, a resolution to this
matter. There, he indicates that he found in personalism a wonderful ally in
forming his own theology of Scripture. Thus, he proposed that
the Old Testament is the connecting link between heathenism and
Christianity. It presents religion in the process of transformation from
superstition to rationality, from sorcery and divination to rational
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faith, from particularism to universalism, and from nationalism to
individualism. ,,9
This rationalism characteristic of the personalistic approach to
Scripture undoubtedly bore the imprint of Bowne. This is also seen in an
early essay titled "The Evolution of Modem Bible Study.,,10 In it, Knudson
bridged the chasm between the natural and the supernatural (man's word
versus God's word) by the doctrine of divine immanence. Further, he saw
that the Kantian doctrine of the activity of the mind allowed the Church to
transcend the static views of biblical inerrancy and inspiration, and that the
idea of evolution admitted the development of the doctrine of progressive
revelation. Finally, the reception of the results of higher criticism enabled a
more sophisticated hermeneutic to be applied to Scripture. These, Knudson
held, were the main developments in modem philosophy which made it
possible for the Church to adjust Christian thought to modernity "so as to
he anci f S' ,,11preserve t ient reverence or cnpture.
9 Albert Cornelius Knudson, The Old Testament Problem (Cincinnati: Jennings and
Graham, 1908), 52; italics mine. This book was occasioned by Knudson's inauguration as
Professor of Old Testament at Boston University.
10 Albert Cornelius Knudson, "The Evolution of Modem Bible Study, "Methodist
Review 93 (November 1911): 899-910.
1I Ibid., 907.
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Like Bowne then, Knudson objected to abstract infallibility, forced
inerrancy, mechanical inspiration and dogmatic euthoritarianism." In
almost typical Bownean fashion, he sought to divert attention away from the
"impersonalism" of all of the above toward an emphasis on the ethical
inspiration of the Bible. The crucial issue was that of authority, and here,
Knudson insisted that "the real authority of Scripture is to be found in the
realm of the spirit. ... The Bible has lost, then, for us the authority of force,
but it has not lost the force of authority." 13 In other words, for Knudson,
the power of Scripture lay in its ability to move the person, rather than in
any magical quality of the text itself.
As one who had received part of his theological training in Germany,
Hinckley Mitchell's student turned out to be every bit the higher critic of
Scripture that the teacher had been. Knudson accepted, for example, the
main outlines of the source theory of Pentateuchal origins proposed by the
12Knudson later surnrnarizcd his thoughts on these issues in Chapter 1I of his
Present Tendencies in Religious Thought (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1924), titled
"The Problem of Biblical Authority."
"Ibid., 128, 131. Earlier, Knudson appealed to Bowne's pragmatism: "For the
ultimate test of religious truth is not to be found in any absolute objective authority. It is to
be found in experience .... The significant thing, then, in connection with the Bible is not
its technical infallibility, in case that could be proven, but its ability to deepen and enrich
the religious life and so to produce conviction" ("The Evolution of Modern Bible Study":
909).
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famous German religious historian, Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918), the
division of the prophecies of Isaiah and Zechariah into two authors, and a
second century Be dating for the book of Daniel. 14 The liberal emphasis on
the historical-grammatical method and the historical aspects of religion was
also manifest in Knudson. In the volume devoted to the theology of the Old
Testament, his explicit objective was "to give an account of the origin and
development of the leading religious ideas of the Old Testament.'?"
At the same time, however, Knudson's evangelical commitment could
be detected amidst his liberalism. For Knudson, liberalism taken to its
extremes would result in a reductionism of biblical religion." Thus, he had
no problem adhering to traditional notions of Scriptural authorship should
14 On the Pentateuch, see Knudson's The Religious Teaching if the Old Testament
(New York: The Abingdon Press, 1918),26-28; on Isaiah, see his Beacon Lights of
Prophecy (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1914), Chapter Vll; on Zechariah,
Daniel, and other books, The Religious Teaching of the Old Testament, 43-45, has an
"Outline of Development" which gives a synoptic view of Knudson's critical conclusions to
introductory matters of the Old Testament in the form of a chart.
"Knudson, The Religious Teaching if the Old Testament, 13. In "The Evolution
of Modern Bible Study": 908, Knudson spoke of revelation as "an organic movement
covering centuries of time. "
16In commenting on the Old Testament prophets, for example, Knudson wrote that
"a pure rationalistic religion is no religion at all. The great achievement of the prophets lie
in the fact that while purifying and spiritualizing religion to a degree never before attained,
they still preserved its pristine power. This fact, once for all, sets them high above all
philosophers and sages" (Beacon Lights of Prophecy, 48-9).
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the evidence not dictate otherwise. 17 Further, Knudson also did not insist on
an a priori rejection of either miracles or of predictive prophecy. With
regard to the former, Knudson scorned what he considered to be the
"dogmatic rejection of the miraculous" by liberal German scholarship. IS
As for the latter, Knudson held, for example, that "eschatology preceded
literary prophecy instead of the reverse. There is, therefore, no valid ground
for eliminating the Messianic passages from the writings of the pre-exilic
prophets." 19
While in critical matters Knudson simply confirmed the path trod by
Mitchell, in the social aspects of Biblical theology the student advanced far
beyond the teacher. From The Old Testament Problem to The Prophetic
Movement in Israel almost thirteen years later, Knudson's biblical theology
17 See, e.g., Albert Cornelius Knudson, "The So-Called J Decalogue," The Journal
of Biblical Literature 28:1 (1909): 81-99, where he argues against Wellhausen that the
evidence does not preclude Mosaic authorship of certain portions of the Pentateuch, in this
case, the "J Decalogue" (Exo. 34:10-26).
18 Albert Cornelius Knudson, "The Philosophy and Theology of Leading Old
Testament Critics," Bibliotheca Sacra LXIX:273 (January 1912): 16 if. It is important to
note, however, that Knudson was careful to insist that by voicing his objection to the
German critics, he did not himself "feel constrained to accept any particular Old Testament
miracle" (Ibid.: 20).
19Knudson, Beacon Lights of Prophecy, vii Knudson, however, qualifies his
endorsement of predictive prophecy by insisting that the Old Testament prophets were not
primarily predictors; even when they were, what was of significance was not in the "mere
unveiling of the future, but in the moral quality of the prediction" (Ibid., 30-1).
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reflected his concern with the moral and social attitudes of the Hebrew
prophets. Thus, in the latter work, a resolute indictment is heaped on the
existing social oppression, followed by a call for social transformation.i"
Knudson's exegesis of the Old Testament had led him earlier to identify
prophetic nationalism both as opposed to individualism and as a summons
for social solidarity." He therefore spoke approvingly of the Social Gospel
and argued that the belief in social progress would have to emphasize
external and material well-being against the eschatological millenialism,
individualism, spiritualism, and asceticism of certain segments of pietistic
Christianity." In these matters, Knudson was both evangelical and liberal.
Knudson's work as a biblical scholar should not be ignored in any
estimation of his labors in systematic theology. Although he was well versed
in the critical methods of theological liberalism, he maintained a distinct
commitment to evangelical faith. As we have seen above, the personalism of
20 Albert Cornelius Knudson, The Prophetic Movement in Israel (New York:
Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1921), 113-16.
21 See Chapter XIV of Knudson's, The Religious Teachings of the Old Testament,
titled "Nationalism and Individualism, fl 316-350.
22 Knudson, Present Tendencies, 284 ff; Knudson discusses the Social Gospel
extensively in a lengthy fina1 chapter to this volume titled, "The Social Gospel and Its
Theological Implications. "
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Bowne is clearly evidenced in Knudson's understanding of revelation, his
doctrine of Scripture, and biblical formulation of his social ethics.
KNUDSON AND THE ADVANCE OF LIBERALISM
IN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY
While the foundations of Knudson's evangelical liberalism were
formed during this first part of his career, it is indisputable that his theology
was erected upon a much broader base than Biblical studies. In fact,
Knudson called his approach "historical as well as personalistic.t'P The
former denoted the history of the Church and its creedal pronouncements,
and the latter the additional theological sources of reason and experience."
Knudson's view of these additional sources of theology requires that some
understanding be gained about his overarching theological method.
For the eightieth birthday of Henry Sheldon, Knudson wrote an article
for his predecessor wherein he called Sheldon "Methodism's most learned
13Knudson, "A Personalistic Approach to Theology," 233.
24 See Knudson's discussion of "Sources and Method" in The Doctrine of God
(New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1930), 182 if. In insisting on these four sources
of theology, Knudson was simply echoing what has since come to be characterized as the
spirit of Wesley's own theological method: "The Wesleyan Quadrilateral" (see Donald A.
D. Thorsen, The Wesleyan Quadrilateral: Scripture, Tradition, Reason, and Experience
as a Model of Evangelical Theology [Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House,
1990)).
70
and most influential theologian.v" He expressed gratitude to his teacher for
boldly making "the transition from the older to the newer type of Methodist
theology," especially in the field of apologetics. 26 Knudson praised
Sheldon's approach which was "at once more empirical and more rational,
truer to the genius of Methodism, and more in accord with modem
science.?" It is therefore, not surprising that Knudson himself employed
both a rational and empirical method in formulating his systematic theology,
and devoted a great deal of energy in defense of this method." Both need to
be outlined here since the theological conclusions that he drew would be
inexplicable apart from them.
25 Albert Cornelius Knudson, "Henry Clay Sheldon," Methodist Review 107
(March 1925): 175.
26Ibid.: 179. In contrast to John Miley and other reputable nineteenth century
Methodist theologians in the "older" camp, Knudson applauded Sheldon's "newer"
theology, which other primary differences included an anthropocentric approach to the
doctrine of the Trinity, an accent on the human factor in christology, an understanding of
the atonement similar to Bowne's "moral theory," and an emphasis on divine immanence.
"Ibid.: 184. Bowne's influence on Sheldon is also noted by Knudson. This essay
is referenced rather extensively by Bernhardt's "The Influence of Borden Parker Bowne"
in his assessment of Sheldon's relationship to Bowne.
2. Aside from his many articles on the subject, see also Chapters ill and IV of
Present Tendencies in Religious Thought (on experience and reason as bases of religious
belief), Chapter V of The Doctrine of God ("Sources and Method"), The Validity of
Religious Experience (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1937), and Basic Issues in
Christian Thought (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950), Chapter 1. Our
discussion in the remainder of this section will draw on all of these writings.
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In the same way that Kant's doctrine of the rational a priori countered
both the sensationalistic empiricism and metaphysical dogmatism of his
time, Knudson considered the religious apriori first given currency by Ernst
Troeltsch (1865-1923), the German historian of religion, as indispensable in
meeting the perils of naturalistic positivism and theological dogmatism."
By "religious apriori," Knudson meant three things: that religion
1)... in spite of all its uniqueness, is not an isolated phenomenon, but
stands in a structural relation to life or reason as a whole .... 2) is
not something secondary and derivative, but something fundamental
and irreducible, so much so as the intellectual, moral and aesthetic
interests of men .... 3) rests upon as sure a basis as does either
science or ethics.30
Simply put then, Knudson advocated "reason" as a "supplementary and
regulative or formal source of theology.":" Later in his life, Knudson re-
affirmed the import of reason in much stronger terms when he insisted that
we must "try the spirits" of revelation before the bar of human reason; "the
authenticity of revelation is dependent wholly upon its inherent spirituality
29 Albert Cornelius Knudson, "Religious Apriorism," Studies in Philosophy and
Theology, ed. E. C. Wilm (New York: Abingdon Press, 1922), 93-127; pp. 101-10 of this
essay is an exposition of Troeltsch's own views.
30 Ibid., 126. Bowne found himself holding a similar view when he wrote in 1902,
"We must assume that religion is founded inhuman nature as one of its essential needs and
constitutional tendencies" (Theism, 9).
31 Knudson, The Doctrine of God, 185; emphasis mine.
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and rationality. The human mind quickened by the divine Spirit is the sale
judge of its validity.,,32
This explains Knudson's offensive against what he saw to be the
theological irrationalism of the emerging school ofNeo-Orthodoxy. Also
known as "dialectical theology" (following Kierkegaard's insistence on the
"infinite qualitative distinction between God and man"), the new theology
launched by Karl Barth's Der Roemerbrief(l919) had, by the late 1920s,
exerted an enormous theological influence on American theologians.
Knudson, however, objected strongly to Nee-Orthodoxy and judged it a
failure on three fronts: its ontological dualism, its philosophical positivism,
and its celebration of theological paradox.33 First, he denied the chasm
between God and man by arguing that "creation binds the two together and
makes forever impossible an absolute antithesis between them.,,34 Secondly,
he insisted that "if reason is not trustworthy beyond the phenomenal realm,
32 Knudson, Basis Issues in Christian Thought, 40; italic mine.
33 Albert Cornelius Knudson, "The Theology of Crisis," Report of the Sixth
Biennial Meeting of the Conference of Theological Seminaries in the United States and
Canada Bulletin 6 (September 1928): 52-77. The influence of Bowne's emphasis on
cosmic monism and the absolute trustworthiness of reason underscores the first two points.
34lbid.: 75.
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there is no valid ground for holding that 'faith' is.,,35 Finally, he saw that
the dialectical nature of the new theology resulted in an endless series of
paradoxes leaving faith ultimately unsecured.
Like Bowne, Knudson was careful to emphasize the distinction
between what he espoused in contrast to the dogmatic authoritarianism of
the older rationalism.P Formally, the religious a priori interpreted religious
experience (rather than creating it), and justified "not an abstract religion of
reason, but actual historic religion.v" Reason and experience were therefore
both integral to a personalistic theology, and were correlative terms as the
form and content of Christian theology.
Growing up in a Methodist pastorate left Knudson with a lifelong
interest in religious experiences. In reflecting upon his pietistic upbringing,
Knudson recalled that
35 Ibid. Knudson later wrote that this philosophical or metaphysical skepticism was
the most serious threat to ongoing theological vitality, and that ultimately, "a theology
which feeds on philosophical skepticism will perish thereby" ("Humanism and
Barthianism," Religion in Life 1 [Winter 1935]: 31).
36 Bowne argued for the need to distinguish between the true orthodoxy of essential
Christianity from the false dogmas of speculative rationalism; see Chapter VI of his Studies
in Christianity, "The Church and the Truth," especially pp. 377 ff,
37 Knudson, Present Tendencies in Religious Thought, 249; in contrast, Knudson is
careful to remind his readers that the old theology subordinated history to reason.
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in our home and in the church it was religious experience that was
emphasized, a unique emotional experience at what was looked upon
as the beginning of the Christian life and a life of trust and obedience
thereafter .... By parental training I was predisposed in its favor, and
this predisposition was later strengthened by a vivid personal religious
experience."
This inclination was re-affirmed by subjecting these experiences to the
process of critical investigation. Early on Knudson came to understand that
because religious experience grew out of the religious a priori, it was an error
to separate religious experience from faith and treat it as an
independent entity .... Religious experience is the concrete
expression of faith and as such shares in its self-evidencing character.
It represents an independent principle in human life that in the last
analysis neither needs nor can find an external support. It thus
justifies itself."
Except for briefly in The Doctrine ofGod,40 however, Knudson fails to give
serious thought to the subject for the next decade. His definitive statement
is finally capsulated in The Validity of Religious Experience, where the
implicit method of his earlier systematic theology is explicated.
In this book, Knudson defined "religious experience" and "religious
38 Knudson, "A Personalistic Approach to Theology," 219-20.
39 Knudson, Present Tendencies in Religious Thought, 180, 184.
4OKnudson, The Doctrine of God, 192-5; the preliminary nature of the discussion
is evident in the book leaving the reader unsatisfied. In The Philosophy of Personalism
(1927), Knudson does discuss empiricism at various points, but does not, due to the nature
of the book, address the issue of theological method.
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consciousness" as involving the feeling, willing, and doing elements of
religious life." Central to the book is the question concerning the
trustworthiness of religious experience. Knudson defended the verity of
religious experience along three lines. The first two--consisting ofthe
psychological immediacy that is most clearly felt in the intuition of the
"numinous" apart from conscious meditarion.V and the pragmatic utility of
religious experience--granted the believer a certitude (rather than a certainty)
that inferred and begged the theistic question. 43 Both pointed toward the
metaphysical realm whereby the human religious nature is understood as a
self-verifying a priori, and religious experience as having autonomous
41 Knudson, The Validity of Religious Experience, 25; this book is an expansion of
an earlier article, "The Apologetic Value of Religious Experience," Journal a/Religion 10
(1935): 448-61.
42 Knudson denied that religious experience presented one with a metaphysical
immediacy of the "numinous," because the resultant merger of the self and the Absolute
obliterated the subject-object distinction and made knowledge impossible. He is here
struggling with a tension. On the one hand, in approving of the concept of the "numinous"
as used by Rudolf Otto in his famous book, The Idea of the Holy, Knudson recognizes that
Otto ultimately admits a sort of metaphysical immediacy in the religious experience of the
numen (see Otto's discussion in The Idea a/the Holy, tr. John W. Harvey [New York:
Galaxy Books, 1958]). On the other hand, because ofhis epistemological dualism,
Knudson can only insist on "mutual otherness as an indispensable condition of man's
experience and knowledge of God" (The Validity a/Religious Experience, 69). He thus
settles for what he calls psychological immediacy wherein the instantaneousness of the
religious intuition of the holy is preserved within the context of a dualistic theory of
knowledge.
"Knudson, The Validity a/Religious Experience, 95,144.
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validity.
With the demise of ontological dualism then, Knudson was able to
deny the traditional distinction between "evangelical" and "mystical":
"Every truly Christian experience is an experience of Christ, and every
experience of Christ is both an 'evangelical' and a 'mystical' experience.T"
The essential content of Christian experience therefore remained unchanged:
"It is still faith in a living God and a living Christ; it is still a consciousness
of the Divine Presence; it is still an assurance of a more abundant life, here
and hereafter.?" What had changed was that the legitimacy of religious
convictions was no longer grounded in an external or infallible authority.
Rather, Knudson appealed once more to the religious a priori: "The only
authority that we can recognize is one that is inner and spiritual, an authority
manifest in religious experience.'?"
By his appeal to both reason and experience, Knudson was simply
44 Ibid., 221; the doctrine of divine immanence further assured that the Christian
experience of Christ was also that of God.
45 Ibid., 230-1.
46 Ibid. As Knudson concluded in his last book, the "essence" of Christianity is "the
modem substitute for the infallible book and the infallible church of the past. But what this
essence is, cannot be determined by purely inductive means. A subjective personal factor
enters unavoidably into an inquiry of this kind" (Basic Issues in Christian Thought, 49).
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applying central principles of the philosophy of personalism to the
theological task. Here was the evangelical liberal at his best. On the one
hand, Knudson diverged little, if any, from the cardinal doctrines of the
Christian faith; on the other, he sought a critical theology, and found it
best erected on a rational and experiential-a personalistio-rnethod." It
remains for us, then, to summarize the results of Knudson's two-volume
systematic theology: The Doctrine of God and The Doctrine of Redemption.
Because personalism plays such an important role in Knudson's
systematic theology, it is appropriate to see volume one as a philosophical
theology. After dealing with theological prolegomena in Part 1,48 he
addresses in Part II the existence, absoluteness, personality, and goodness of
God, devoting the final chapter to the doctrine of the Trinity. As will be
seen, Knudson demonstrates throughout the compatibility of personalism
with Christian theology.
47 One wonders, however, whether or not Knudson was truly faithful to the rational
pole of personalistic method, or if his emphasis on religious experience left him open to the
charge of subjectivism. His colleague, E. S. Brightman, for one, invoked the criterion of
coherence because he was not convinced that the religious a priori was self-justifying or
that religious experience was self-authenticating. More on this in the next chapter.
48 Entitled "The Province of Theology," Part I covers the relationship between
religion, Christian faith, science and philosophy with theology; Chapter IV is devoted to
"Sources and Method."
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In his arguments for God's existence, Knudson places greatest
emphasis on the religious and moral arguments since our moral and religious
natures (a prioris) "can find ultimate satisfaction only in the belief in
God.,,49 Knudson finds further support in the epistemological and causal
arguments and concludes that while these "do not demonstrate the existence
of God, ... the theistic world-view is 'the line ofleast resistance' [one of
Bowne's most characteristic phrases] for the intellect as it is also for the
moral and religious nature.,,50
Knudson then defends the classical notion of God's absoluteness. He
rejects the "unrelated" absolute of agnosticism and the "unlimited" absolute
of pantheism in favor of the absolute as the "independent or self-existent
ground of the world [Bowne], and in this sense, practical1y synonymous
with the idea of creatorship."?' Under God's absoluteness, Knudson
includes discussions on omnipotence, omnipresence and eternity.f To say
49 Knudson, The Doctrine of God, 237.
so Ibid., 241.
51 Ibid., 248.
S2 As will be seen in Chapter V, Brightman departed from the evangelical tradition
by abandoning these aspects of God's absolutism as incompatible with the rational and
empirical demands of personalistic method.
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that God is omnipotent is simply to say that "there is a unitary and absolute
power upon which the world depends;,,53 God's omnipresence speaks of the
divine power sustaining the world and identifies "the ultimate cosmic energy
with his [God's] will;,,54 God's eternity points to the divine transcendence of
time since "intelligence implies a supertemporal element and personality
constitutes itself one and the same in spite of the multiplicity and change
involved in its own consciousness and activity.?"
In discussing the personality of God, Knudson admits that this is
"known to us directly only in its human form.,,56 By analogy, then, God is
"superpersonal," but only so long as it is recognized that this is not an
unbridled anthropomorphism; rather, this points to God's "life of free
intelligence" and to a "higher type of consciousness and will than that
represented by human personality"? Knudson discusses God's unity,
identity, self-consciousness and self-control, "the last three of which, when






applied to the Supreme Person, may perhaps better be designated as
immutability, omniscience, and freedom.?" Echoes of this can be seen in
Knudson's definition of "personalism" given in an earlier book:
... that form of idealism which gives equal recognition to both the
pluralistic and monistic aspects of experience and which finds in the
conscious unity, identity, and free activity of personality the key to
the nature of reality and the solution of the ultimate problems of
philosophy. 59
God's goodness is predicated on the divine personhood. Against
dogmatic legalism, Knudson emphasizes God as "personal/ave," and
against impersonal naturalism, God is "loving Person.,,60 There is therefore
no contradictory tension between the divine personality and divine love.
"Personality is incomplete without love, and love without personality is
nonexistent.':" As benign beyond human benevolence, God is also to be
"Ibid., 311. In his earlier Old Testament theology, Knudson found biblical and
exegetical support for the doctrine of the personality of God. Thus, for example, God is
free in his relation to nature and history; the world is a testimony to the divine will and
intelligence; miracles demonstrate God's "free relationship to the world" (The Religious
Teaching of the Old Testament, 61-65).
'9Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism, 87.
6OKnudson, The Doctrine of God, 352 .
s1Ibid. Knudson does not clearly distinguish (as later personalists do) between
"person" (what is given) and "personality" (that which persons develop). Unless he is
prepared to admit that God is developing personality, which he is not, to speak of God's
"personality" thus becomes problematic.
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considered as "supermoral.v'"
Finally, in discussing the Trinity, Knudson attempts to steer away
from making sharp personal distinctions within God as the older theologies.
Rather, he emphasizes the Trinity as a "symbol of the richness of the idea of
God, ,,63 and prefers a modified version of ancient Sabellianism wherein
"God in his essential nature is all that is indicated by the terms 'Father,'
'Son,' and 'Spirit, without attempting to define more precisely the character
of the distinctions in his being so named and their relation to each other.,,64
In this second volume, Knudson covers the remaining portions of
systematic theology, including the world, humanity, sin, the person and
work of Christ, the Christian life, the Church, and the Christian hope. I will
limit my discussion of the application of personalism to Knudson's
anthropology, Christology, and soteriology.
For Knudson, the two primary biblical concepts of humanity are
"image of God" and "divine sonship", The former, based on the Old
62 Ibid., 367.
63 Ibid., 424; italics mine.
64 Ibid., 425. Sabellius of Rome was branded as a heretic in the third century C.E.
because of his insistence that "Father," "Son," and "Spirit" referred to successive and
temporal manifestations of God rather than to essential Trinitarian distinctions.
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Testament, points to the rational, moral, and spiritual nature of the human
race." The latter, emphasized in the New Testament, is a corollary of
Bowne's doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. While all are children of God
by virtue of God as creator, in a higher sense, "divine sonship" "identifies
the ideal human life with Christ and implies that it consists in a spiritual
achievement [process and development] rather than a passive inheritance.,,66
Against the determinism found in theological Calvinism, philosophical
naturalism, and psychological behaviorism, Knudson was also an ardent
champion of human freedom. What he was careful to argue for, however,
was "metaphysical" freedom (in contrast to merely "moral" or
"psychological" freedom), by which he meant the human ability "to conduct
., Albert Cornelius Knudson, The Doctrine of Redemption (New York: Abingdon-
Cokesbury Press 1983), 83.
"Ibid., 88. The model of "divine sonship" thus completes the model of vdivine
image." Interestingly, Knudson's anthropology was not consistent with the ethics of
personalism in that he may very well, as a "man of his day, " have been a racist. Thus this
startling statement: "Strictly, 'person' is a narrower term [than 'self']. It applies only to
selves that have attained a certain degree of intellectual and moral development; a slave is
not a person, nor is a child" (The Philosophy of Personalism, 83; italics mine). Later
personalists have recognized this as an abominable attitude. In fact, the third generation
personalist, S. Paul Schilling, has gone as far as to confess, after his chastening experiences
with Black Americans, "1 surrendered all my shallow claims of white supremacy and asked
the mercy of God on me, a sinner" ("Developments in My Thought," in Deats and Robb,
eds., The Boston Personalist Tradition, 190; see also Schilling's discussion of Knudson's
limitations on this issue in an earlier essay in the same volume, "Albert Cornelius Knudson:
Person and Theologian," 81-104).
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themselves differently from what they actually do. ,,67 The moral life could
not be maintained with full integrity except "on the basis of metaphysical
freedom or indeterminism.Y"
Against the older doctrines of sin which included the fall, original sin,
and human depravity, Knudson defined sin as
a defective attitude toward God, toward other people, and toward our
true selves, for which we are accountable in God's sight. Its ultimate
origin we have traced to man's power of self-determination; and the
reason for its universality we have found in the enormous difficulties
that stand in the way of man's perfect fulfillment of the moral law. 69
Guilt stems from the "insuperable gulf between what we are and what we
·'Knudson, The Doctrine of Redemption, 123. Knudson was careful to warn that
this freedom was not absolute, but limited by human constitution (physical and rational)
and the environment (social and material), both of which influence conduct.
·'Ibid.,158. Knudson maintained the Wesleyan emphasis of the priority of God
and the human dependence on God by distinguishing between religious and metaphysical
language. The former is that of emotion and worship whereby we properly confess our
finitude in the presence of an infinite and holy God; to deny the latter, however, leads to
predestinationism, of which Knudson in a later article called "the worst moral scandal that
has appeared in the history of Christian thought" ("The Christian Doctrine of Man,"
Theology and Modern Life: Essays in Honor of Harris Franklin Rall, ed, Paul A. Schilpp
[Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co., 1940], 91).
69Knudson, The Doctrine of Redemption, 266. What room did Knudson's
theology hold for the devil? Not much due to its implicit metaphysical and cosmological
monism. Knudson devotes one page to Satan in The Doctrine of Redemption in the
context of a theoretical discussion of original sin, and concludes that "Satan occupies no
logical place in the Christian system of belief" (Ibid., 251). Elsewhere, he says that
"whatever be our belief in the existence of the Devil, we need, as Bowne used to say, to
retain him for rhetorical purposes" (The Principles of Christian Ethics [New York:
Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943], 99; emphasis mine).
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feel we ought to be.,,70
True human nature is therefore to be found in Jesus Christ, in whom
the "divine sonship" is first and fully realized. Knudson rejects the older,
speculative christologies, and opts instead for a "more historical, a more
empirical, a more anthropocentric, a more ethical, and a more personalistic"
approach to the person ofChrist.71 Whereas the traditional christologies
emphasized the deity of Christ, Knudson's called for a renewed focus on
Jesus' complete humanity; whereas previous christologies worked from the
two-nature doctrine established by the Council of Chalcedon (451),
Knudson found Christ's uniqueness to lie in his "dependence on the divine
will and to his unique enduement with the Divine Spirit." The divinity of
Christ was thus considered not ontologically but encountered in his "unique
consciousness of oneness with God and [in] his creative and redemptive
agency in the founding of the Kingdom ofGod."n
Following Bowne then, Knudson also advocated a moral theory of the
atonement. Christ's mediatorship is no longer conceived within a dualistic
70Knudson, The Doctrine of Redemption, 267; italics his.
"Ibid., 318-9.
n Ibid., 319; on these points, Knudson's christology differs little from that
Schleiennacher himself.
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framework; rather Knudson's immanental philosophy understood that
... all our life is mediated to us. We derive everything from others,
and so it is possible that there may be one supreme source of
illumination and inspiration. Such a source we believe Christ to be,
and in this sense he is our mediator ... of revelation, not the only
mediator, but the supreme mediator both in his life and death, and as
such he is unique. His uniqueness is not absolute. It is one of degree,
but it is on that account none the less real and significant."
Salvation then combines both divine grace and human freedom in an
indissoluble tandem. Divine enablement is needed as we "cannot in [our]
own strength bridge the gulfthat separates the ideal from the real.,,74
Freedom of the will provides us with a "new method of realizing the ideal.
Instead of trusting itself: it now trusts God. Divine grace thus supplements
human freedom and the two co-operate in man's redemption.Y"
Further, from the biblical basis of his social theology, Knudson was
led to conclude that redemption is "both present and future, both temporal
and etemal.?" This social emphasis had, in fact, never been absent from
"Ibid., 379; emphasis Knudson's.
74 Ibid., 166. In The Principles of Christian Ethics, 132, Knudson succinctly
summarizes the Christian ideal as "self-realization through self-sacrifice .... Brotherly love
is grounded in the worth of the individual, in the sacredness of personality, and in a
universal moral ideal."
7SKnudson, The Doctrine of Redemption, 167. Knudson remained within the
Wesleyan tradition by maintaining this synergistic view of salvation.
76 Ibid., 473.
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his thought throughout his professional career. Undoubtedly, the two world
wars and the great economic depression of the 1930s demanded that a
systematic theologian of Knudson's caliber address such matters. 77 Here
again, however, Knudson eschewed dogmatic plans and programs for social
recovery, favoring instead a return to the personalistic principle enunciated
by Bowne that "life is more than logic." Thus, for example, Knudson
insisted at the height of World War II that Christianity did not come fully
equipped with an economic doctrine, and in this light, "capitalism needs to
be fused with socialism for the best of both truths.?" In spite of the fact
that socialism was quite unpopular during this time, Knudson recognized
that a genuine personalism necessarily led to egalitarianism, and therefore
sought to combine a biblically based socialism with the western capitalistic
ideal as the most effective means toward social transformation.
In all of this, Knudson was careful to avoid the mechanical and
speculative theories behind the older theologies. His personalistic method
77 Interestingly, Kathleen Kilgore, Transformations, 170 ff., tells us that there were
socialist and pacifist causes located at the Boston University School of Theology
throughout the 1930s; in fact, the Social Christian Club met within and under the auspices
of the School of Theology during this period.
78 Knudson, The Principles of Christian Ethics, 280.
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allowed him to center more on the rational and empirical aspects of theology
which led to an anthropocentric rather than theocentric focus. However,
since Knudson defined "theology" as "the systematic exposition and rational
justification of the intellectual content of religion.t'" the end result is simply
the culmination of the means.
SUMMARY OF KNUDSON'S INFLUENCE IN
METHODIST THEOLOGY
The Methodist historian, William McCutcheon, is correct in saying
that during the 1920s, "every major theologian in the Methodist Episcopal
Church considered himself as evangelical liberal.T" This is certainly the
case with Knudson himself; and this in spite of his detractors. While critics
like Robert Chiles are correct in seeing in Knudson a shift from revelation to
reason, from sinful man to moral man, and from free grace to free will,81 his
condemnation of Knudson's theology as "Methodist apostasy" 82 is certainly
79 Knudson, The Doctrine of God, 19.
"'McCutcheon, "American Methodist Thought and Theology," in Burke, ed.,
3:263.
81This is Chiles' argument in Theological Transition in American Methodism.
82 Robert Chiles, "Methodist Apostasy: From Free Grace to Free Will," Religion in
Life 27:3 (Summer 1958): 438-49.
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too harsh. To be sure, Knudson did revise Wesley in a number of central
categories. However, in light of the Christian tradition, Knudson's
evangelicalism is irrefutable. He believed unequivocally in the soteriological
centrality of Christ, and in Christianity as the quintessential religion.83
Further, Knudson's evangelical liberalism was by no means a deviant
theology held by a trivial minority. In his doctoral dissertation, McCutcheon
tells of Knudson's widespread influence:
... no one theologian left greater impact upon the Methodist
Episcopal Church in the period of1925-1950 than did Professor
Knudson .... In these years, the mention of "Methodist" implied
"personalism" in which turn implied "Knudson." Such an extensive
account of his theology is needed for as yet no one had studied him
in articulate detail. To do so is to understand in large number the
prevailing Methodist theology in the quarter century, 1925-1950.84
Rather than implying that the sole criterion of orthodoxy is prevalent
acceptance, I am simply calling attention to the fact that Knudson's was the
83Knudson wrote: "Jesus, therefore, stands out as unique among the religious
founders of the world .... Unlike the others, he is himself essential to the religion he
established. His personality is part and parcel of the church's faith. To believe in God is
for the Christian to believe in Christ; and to believe in Christ is to believe in God. This
unique fact sets Jesus apart from all other religious leaders. He is redeemer in a sense that
they are not. He mediates between God and man. He is the perfect revealer of the Father
and a redemptive power in the lives of men" (The Doctrine of Redemption, 283) .
.. McCutcheon, "Theology in the Methodist Episcopal Church," 155 (emphasis
mine). Unfortunately, no one since McCutcheon has devoted much attention to recovering
Knudson's contributions to an evangelical liberal Methodist theology.
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most respected mid-twentieth century effort to make both biblical and
systematic theology palatable to the modem Methodist mind. On the one
hand, Knudson firmly resisted the currents of traditional conservatism,
uncritical pietism and dogmatic Fundamentalism which threatened the
Methodist church during the first half of the twentieth century. On the
other hand, he also attempted to thorough rethinking of Christian theology
in the light of a critical personalistic philosophy.
Knudson's importance is also not exaggerated by Harold DeWolf
who says that Knudson "did more than anyone else to make 'Boston
Personalism' a proud historical tradition.?" The impact ofthe teacher
Bowne upon the student was such that it would not be far from the truth to
say that personalism was the driving force behind Knudson's endeavors in
systematic theology. As such, following in the footsteps of Bowne,
Knudson's ultimately remained a relatively conventional theology. It is only
when we come to the work of his contemporary, Edgar S. Brightman, that
original and creative contributions to philosophical theology can be found.
"L. Harold DeWolf, "Albert Cornelius Knudson: As Philosopher," The
Personalist 35:4 (October 1954): 366; DeWolfis a third generation personalist who sat
under both Knudson and Brightman, and who taught both philosophy and theology at
Boston University from 1944-65.
CHAPTER V
BRIGHTMAN: FROM LIBERALISM TO
MODERNISM AND PLURALISM
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Edgar Sheffield Brightman was Knudson's younger contemporary by
eleven years. I Like Knudson, he also was born to a Methodist clergyman,
arriving on 20 September 1884, to George Edgar and Mary Sheffield
Brightman in Holbrook, Massachusetts. His was a typical parsonage
upbringing, full of religious influences and theological reading beginning at
a young age.
Brightman attended Brown University where, during his first year, he
learned from Dean Alexander Meiklejohn what he would return to all his
life: the logical method of empirical coherence. As an undergraduate, he was
IBrightman's biography is yet to be written. My sketch relies on the biographical
sections of Paul E. Johnson, "Brightman's Contributions to Persona1ism," The Personalist
35:1 (Winter 1954): 59-72, and Walter G. Muelder, "Edgar S. Brightman: Person and
Moral Philosopher," in Deats and Robb, eds., The Boston Personalist Tradition, 105-20,
along with Brightman's own "Religion as Truth," in Ferrn, ed., Contemporary American
Theology, especially 55-7.
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enchanted first by Plato, Berkeley and Nietzsche, and later by Kant,
Schopenhauer, and Royce. The latter's absolutism was Brightman's "first
real allegiance . . . accepted as a whole for two or three years, until, in my
graduate days, James's Pragmatism appeared and swept me off my feet."z
From Brown, Brightman obtained his AB. in 1906, and his AM. in
1908. He then went on to Boston for his doctorate, and while there, studied
under both Bowne and Knudson. He acknowledged that "Bowne gave me a
personalism which seemed to me to combine the truth that there was in
Royce and James with a criticism of the errors of each."? As part of his
doctoral studies, Brightman also spent a year at the Universities of Berlin
and Marburg in Germany.
After receiving his Ph.D. in 1912, Brightman taught philosophy,
psychology and Bible at Nebraska Wesleyan University and at Wesleyan
University in Middletown, Connecticut. 4 In 1919, he accepted the invitation
2Brightman, "Religion as Troth," 57.
3 Ibid.
4 Brightman's biblical scholarship, often overlooked, is attested to by his The
Sources of the Hexateuch (New York: Abingdon Press, 1918), where he outlines and
analyses the critical consensus regarding the documentary source theory of the first six
books of the Old Testament. He also wrote Historical Outline of the Bible, later revised
by his student, Walter G. Muelder (Berea, KY: Berea College Press, 1936).
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of the Graduate School of Boston University to the position of Borden
Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy, and remained there until his death.
Brightman maintained an exhausting schedule all his life. He wrote
tirelessly, publishing fourteen books, and almost 700 articles, pieces
ranging from philatelic notes and letters to book reviews and philosophic
essays. He also mastered seven foreign languages-Hebrew, Greek Latin,
German, French, Spanish, and Italian--which were used in his enormous
worldwide correspondence. As a teacher he was very involved with his
students and also immersed in the academic world.5 Besides all of this, he
also attended Newton Center Methodist Episcopal Church twice a week
taught at pastor's schools periodically, and maintained ecclesiastical
contacts. His pace detensified after a heart attack in 1949. He eventually
succumbed to a stroke and passed away on 25 February 1953.
5 On Brightman as teacher, see Peter A. Bertocci and M. Alicia Corea, eds., "Edgar
Sheffield Brightman Through His Students' Eyes," The Philosophical Forum 12 (1954):
53-67. Brightman's academic involvement included participation at numerous
philosophical congresses, and memberships with the American Philosophical Association
(Eastern Division), the American Theological Society (Eastern Section), the National
Association of Biblical Instructors (all of which he has also served as president), the Mind
Association (British), the Kant-Gesellschaft, the National Council of Religion and Higher
Education, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and, in the last seven years of his
life, a local group that he founded called the Philosophers Anonymous of Greater Boston.
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BRIGHTMAN THE PHILOSOPHER
In one of his earliest books, An Introduction to Philosophy,
Brightman defined the five main areas of philosophy as methodology,
epistemology, metaphysics, axiology, and the history of philosophy.?
Although Bowne had done some work in the area of axiology, he applied
himself primarily to epistemology and metaphysics. Knudson had dealt with
the history of philosophy from a personalist perspective in The Philosophy
of Personalism. It remained for Brightman to develop a personalistic
method and a more comprehensive value theory.
Brightman himselfwamed that "I am not a theologian and my
approach to the problems of human experience has always been
philosophical rather than theological."? As such, he was motivated by a life-
long quest for philosophical truth. The question and answers of method
raised by his first teacher in philosophy, Dean Meiklejohn, was one that
Brightman never ceased to employ and refine throughout his life.
The first fruits of his thinking on the subject were expressed in his
6 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, 3rd. ed., rev. by
Robert N. Beck (1925; New York: Holt Rinehart Winston, 1963),9-12.
7 Brightman, "Religion as Truth," 53.
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1912 doctoral dissertation: "The Criterion of Religious Truth in the Theology
of Albrecht Ritschl." Brightman concluded this study by proposing to
"correct Ritschl's empiricism by a personalism (of Professor Bowne's type),
that recognizes the unity of the subject, and looks on the harmonious,
consistent realization of the total personal life as the ultimate criterion of
truth .... ,,8 Brightman later was prepared to say that "personality .. .is the
final seat of authority, the source of all sources.:"
What, however, did Brightman mean by "personality"? His clearest
answer came in an essay on the idea of "personality as a metaphysical
principle." In addition to the standard definitions proposed by Bowne and
Knudson of "individuality, consciousness, and will," he said that
personality is a complex whole, in which form, content, and activity
are found in indivisible and inseparable unity. By form, I mean the
laws of reason; by content, the brute facts of experience (sense data,
pleasures, pains, desires, and the like); and by activity, the power of
will to choose and control the course of consciousness within limits."
It is clear from this definition that Brightman desired that his
'Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "The Criterion of Religious Truth in the Theology of
Albrecht Ritschl" (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1912), 106.
"Edgar Sheffield Brightman, A Philosophy a/Ideals (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1928), 128.
10 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Personality as a Metaphysical Principle," in
Brightman, ed., Personalism in Theology, 57.
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philosophic method be both rational and empirical. Part of Brightman's
philosophical motivation came from his sensing "the need of supplementing
and correcting Bowne's thought by greater attention to empirical fact, both
in psychology and in the physical and biological sciences, and also by a
more concrete and adequate view of the work of reason; in other words, by
more James and more Hegel."l1 The result of this was Brightman's
"radically empirical" philosophic method. This he equated with being
personalistic, defining it as using "the data of personal consciousness (there
being no other data available), and [being guided] by the purposes and
ideals of personal consciousness. ,,12 Personalistic method therefore is an
empiricism which recognizes the demands of reason and of
experiential fact; of descriptive fact and of value; of part and of whole.
It is both deductive and inductive, both rational and empirical. It
11 Brightman, "Religion as Truth," 57. On Brightman's estimate ofJames and
Hegel, see his "The Versatile James" and "Hegel's Influence," both reprinted in Steinkraus
and Beck, eds., Studies in Personalism, 116-24 and 105-11 respectively.
12 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Person and Reality: An Introduction to Metaphysics,
eds. Peter A. Bertocci, et. al. (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958),22. This
"radical empiricism" evidences the influence of James. Robert J. Vanden Burgt has noted
the parallels between James' pragmatism and Brightman's criterion of truth: both agreed
that "a true idea is what fits in best with the full range of experienced data" ("Philosophical
Roots of the Finite God Theories of William James and Edgar Sheffield Brightman"
[ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 1967], 191).
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starts with personal experience raw and moves to personal experience
interpreted and growing toward rational wholeness.f
Also known as his principle or criterion of coherence, this was the
way in which Brightman sought to take into account the entire spectrum of
human experiences, including all of the empirical sciences, into a
personalistic philosophy. For Brightman, since rational coherence should
not be sacrificed, the laws of reason--defined as being systematically related,
consistent, experientially inclusive, analytic, synoptic, experimentally active,
hypothetically open, critical, and decisively committed to the best available
hypothesis" --should not be violated. Being one of his original contributions
to philosophy," Brightman applied this method to every field of
investigation that he undertook, including his work done in axiology.
13Brightman, Person and Reality, 33. Brightman was careful to insist that
whatever the empirical data of religion, it is inextricably mingled with valuations and
therefore incompletely understood until subjected to careful philosophical reflection; see his
"What Constitutes a Scientific Interpretation of Religion?" Journal of Religion 6 (1926):
250-58.
14 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Nature and Values (New York: Abingdon-
Cokesbury Press, 1945), 106-7.
15 So Gustave H. Todrank, "The Empirical Evidence for Brightman's Theistic
Cosmology" (ph.D. dissertation, Boston Uriiversity, 1956),290-1, who also agreed with
Brightman that this was "the irrefutable criterion of truth for philosophy. It is irrefutable in
that it cannot be denied without being affirmed." Brightman himself noted that while "the
criterion of truth as systematic coherence has been consciously or unconsciously employed
by many of the greatest thinkers from Plato to the present time ... here, however, the
concern is... only with its function as a test of truth" (An Introduction to Philosophy, 77).
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Brightman's life-long interest in axiology--the science of values and
value judgments--was expounded in several volumes." He distinguished
early between intrinsic and instrumental value. Intrinsic value is "whatever
is liked, desired, prized, enjoyed, preferred, or acknowledged as interesting,
important, or worthy of approval for its own sake, ,,17 and included lower
(e.g., health and recreation) and higher (e.g., intellectual, aesthetic, and
religious) classifications. Instrumental value is "prized as a means or a
cause of intrinsic value." 18 Brightman was convinced that the existence of
values itself was sufficient to uncover the deficiencies of naturalism and
support a thoroughgoing personalism as the most viable philosophy oflife.19
He also insisted that personality itself is to be taken as an intrinsic value--
that it was valuable in and of itself; apart from being a means to any end.
Without personality, not only are "all other values corrupted," but "no other
16 Aside from articles and the already referred to Nature and Values, Brightman
also published Religious Values (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1925), and Persons and
Values (Boston: Boston University Press, 1952). He also devoted parts of almost all ofhis
other books to the subject.
17 Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, 187.
I"Ibid., 186.
19 See esp, Chapter VII of Nature and Values, "The Resultant Philosophy of Life."
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values exist. ,,20
How were such values discerned? Brightman deals with this question
in the opening chapter of his Religious Values where he speaks, not
20 Brightman, Persons and Values, 18. Wilbur Handley Mullen has shown that
Brightman's empiricism demanded that "the only locus for the actualization, realization, or
appreciation of values is in the experience of persons" ("A Comparison of the Value
Theories ofE. S. Brightman and A. N. Whitehead," [ph.D. dissertation, Boston
University, 1955], 359; emphasis mine).
Mullen's conclusion, 360, is noteworthy: "A fruitful synthesis of the thought of the
two men might begin by more emphasis on organic relatedness in Brightman's personalistic
pluralism, while Whitehead's concept of God could move profitably in the direction of
Brightman's clear-cut theism." "Organic relatedness," however, is not wholly missing in
Brightman. With his theory of the "Datum Self," Brightman posited that "everything real
is a self at some level of its existence; ... Nothing exists except in, of, and for a self'
("Personality as a Metaphysical Principle," 41). That this bears striking similarity to
Whitehead's theory of "actual occasions" (which comprise the ultimate stuffofreality)
cannot be denied. Further affinities to Whitehead's panpsychism are also evident when
Brightman writes as follows: "A person is a highly developed self. Any conscious being is
a self, no matter how elementary its consciousness is. In fact, we may use the word self as
a limit notion, and speak of the minimum self as the least possible consciousness that can
be. We do not know whether such a self really exists or not, but we have good reason to
believe that there are very elementary subhuman selves, unable to reason or to entertain
ideals. When a self reaches the stage of being able to develop self-consciousness,
reasoning powers, and experience of ideal values, we call it a person" (Ibid.). It is no
wonder that Brightman felt obliged to defend his personalism against the charge of
anthropomorphism. He answers instead that it is "cosmomorphic," since just like space
and time, it is to be found in--rather than created by-human experience. In an earlier
work, Brightman argued that personalism was "theomorphic": "Instead of taking
personality to be too human a category to apply to God, it would really be more logical to
take it as too divine a category to apply to man. No human being is fully personal; if he
were, he would always be conscious, always intellectually, emotionally, and purposively at
his best, always alert and growing .... Most of the time he is a mere shadow of a person, a
fragmentary self, yet a fragment that contains a clue to what a person could be" (ls God a
Person? [New York: Association Press, 1932], 53). Ultimately, Brightman may be faulted
only for using personalistic terminology and concepts to relay the organicism in his
thought, rather than the scientific language of Whitehead (which was quite novel in many
ways but has in our time, been more in vogue).
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surprisingly, of "Coherence as Criterion of Truth and Reasonableness."
Any belief is true "insofar as it organizes, interprets and explains experiences
more consistently, systematically, and economically than any competing
belief'?" The evidence further points to theism as the most (not completely)
coherent interpretation of experience. As such, it is reasonable to accept and
unreasonable to reject. 22 Values then emerge out of such "true" beliefs.
This is supported by his thoughts on the notion of ideals in a later
book. There, Brightman defines an "ideal" as
1) a type of experience which we approve
2) that which forms a hypothesis about future experiences
3) a principle of unity
4) a principle of control and selection
5) a plan of action
6) a social principle, and
7) a principle of love.r'
Characterized by these traits, the ideal is then "the pattern [and] the value is
the product which conforms to the pattern.,,24 Thus, for example, the
21 Brightman, Religious Values, 23.
22 Ibid., 30-1. In fact, just as Bowne fought against epistemological and
metaphysical agnosticism and atheism, Brightman wages his offensive against the
naturalistic philosophies of his day on the battlefield of axiology; see his early essay "Neo-
Realistic Theories of Value," in Wilm, ed., Studies in Philosophy and Theology, 22-64,
which sets the tone for his work on this area.
23 Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals, 68-74.
24 Ibid., 75.
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question of immortality was answered affirmatively by Brightman whose
reasoning included an appeal to the value of personality, and to the
supposition that life was ultimately valuable--even with incompletely realized
ideals that required fulfillment--rather than tragically meaningless.f
The "value oflife," however, raised the question whether or not there
were as many, if not more, disvalues that did not "conform" to the patterned
ideals oflife than there were values that did. By "disvalues,' Brightman
referred to that which was "either hostile to value or even positively
offensive, painful, and otherwise worthy of disapproval.?" Brightman
understood that this aspect of reality, also known as the problem of good-
25 Brightman, Religious Values, 93. In another place, Brightman reasoned that "if
value is to be found in experience ... and if personality is a spiritual whole that finds value
through its own membership in the universal order which includes but transcends all
human persons, there is substantial ground for reasonable hope of immortal life"
(Immortality in Post-Kantian Idealism [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925}, 60).
Later in life, Brightman raised the possibility of "conditional immortality."
Premised on the goodness of God, he proposed that "immortality is not inherent in every
person or every human being as such, but is conditional on the presence in the person of
genuine potentia1ities for spiritual development" (A Philosophy of Religion [New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940],408). Because of the problematic implications of the doctrine,
he was later questioned on this matter by Joseph P. Gibbons, who argued, in part, that
Brightman's doctrine of freedom required the possibility of an eternal hell ("Brightman's
Philosophy of Immortality," The Personalist 54:2 [Spring 1973]: 176-87). Warren
Steinkraus, a student of Brightman's, came to the latter's defense by pointing out that
Brightman's metaphysics did not address the religious doctrine of hell, and by noting much
more commonality between him and Gibbons than Gibbons himself understood ("E.S.
Brightman on Conditional Immortality," The Personalist 56:1 [Winter 1975]: 80-2).
26 Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, 210.
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and-evil, was intimately connected with the question of God, and could not
be adequately answered apart from it.
BRIGHTMAN THE MODERNIST
Brightman himself was first touched by personal tragedy when his
first wife of three years died in 1915 after a tortuous bout with cancer.
Being fully aware of the theistic implications ofthe problem of evil, he
recognized that anyone proposing a comprehensive philosophy of religion
could not avoid the subject. The theodicy developed by Brightman
evidences his departure from the evangelical liberalism of his teacher,
Bowne, and his colleague, Knudson, towards modernism. This modernism
was characterized by his more radically empirical theological method,
utilized even in his philosophic quest for God.
One of Brightman's most concise definitions for God can be found in
his presidential address to the eastern division of the American Philosophical
Association: God is "a cosmic mind, a rational, purposive experient ...
controlling cosmic factors, for an end of the highest possible value.'?" God
27 Address given 29 December 1936, published as "An Empirical Approach to
God," The Philosophical Review 46 (1937): 152.
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then, not only seeks a teleological achievement of value (a doctrine held also
by Bowne's contemporary, Howison), but is also the Source and Continuer
of'values." At the same time, the existence of disvalues is evidenced
everywhere. As Brightman aptly put it later, "the problem of religion, of
law, of statesmanship, of morality, and of philosophy and of science is all
one. It is: How to build cosmos out of chaos.,,29
What, however, did Brightman mean by "chaos"? He was pointing
to the what appeared to be intrinsic to the nature of reality. Beginning with
religious experience, Brightman noted that life's advances always took
the form of opposition and struggle. There is, therefore, something
dualistic about all religion. Light and darkness, God and Satan,
Yang and Yin, sin and redemption, being and nonbeing, thesis and
antithesis, stimulus and response; religion, philosophy, and science
alike testify to the dualistic structure of experience. 30
Brightman found further evidence for the chaotic structure of reality
in the evolutionary process of the cosmos. As early as 1925, in the
aftermath of the famous Scopes trial, Brightman had began studying
28 In his own terminology, Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, 209, spoke of God
as "axiogenesis'' (producer of values) and "axiosoteria" (preserver of values); earlier in the
same book, he said that God is "the only source of values" (Ibid., 135; italics mine).
29Brightman, Nature and Values, 86.
30 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, The Problem of God (New York: The Abingdon
Press, 1930), 177-8; note Brightman's use of the Hegelian dialectic.
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Darwin's The Origin of the Species. In fact, Brightman used this text in his
1926 introductory philosophy course, subjecting it to critical analysis in
order to "determine what philosophical presuppositions were implicit in
Darwin's interpretations and what philosophical inferences of a teleological
nature could be drawn from his facts.,,31 In the next few years, he gained
much from Edmund Noble's Purposive Evolution (1926) and the creative
evolution of the French philosopher, Henri Bergson. His studies in the
biological sciences led him to conclude in 1930 that "the law of evolution is
God's method ofcreation.,,32 This led him to question the "slowness with
which he [God] attains his ends.,,33 This process testified to the existence of
good and evil in the universe, value and disvalue, structure and chaos. The
following quote from Brightman's presidential address summarizes his
empirical observations regarding cosmic chaos:
31 Recollections of Angelo P. Bertocci, Teacher from Little Italy (Washington, DC:
Legation Press, 1990), 169. Bertocei became a convinced personalist as a student of
Brightman's during the mid-1920s, and later achieved some distinction in literary theory as
Professor of Literature at Boston University. His younger brother, Peter, succeeded
Brightman as Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy.
"Edgar Sheffield Brightman, The Problem of God, 123.
33 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, The Finding cf God (New York: The Abingdon
Press, 1931), 124.
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The empirical evidence most directly relevant to the cosmic fate
of values, and hence to the power of goodness in objective reality, is to
be found in the facts of evolution .... An impartial contemplation of
the data of evolution leaves a dual impression of ineradicable teleology
and ineradicable dysteleology. There is ineradicable teleology. The
order, mutual adaptation, and progress in evolution, above all the so-
called 'arrival of the fit', point to a power other than the curve of
probability, arriving at relevance, wholeness, and value .... But with
the teleology, there is ineradicable dysteleology. The incalculable
wastage, the blind alleys, the internecine warfare, the natural plagues
and disasters of the evolutionary process are empirically ineradicable
evidence of dysteleology."
For Brightman, to solve this problem-of structure and chaos, of telos
and dystelos, of good and evil-would be in large part to solve the problem of
God. Since he considered that the problem was primarily a metaphysical
rather than religious one, and since metaphysics utilized a "free, rational
investigation of all available evidence," the results of such a process of
inquiry could never be a "mere appendage to or implication of the Christian
revelation, wholly determined by it, regardless of other facts and reasons.,,35
Brightman's modernism is here plainly evident. Whereas Bowne's
theistic absolutism differed little if any from classical theism, and Knudson
held to Scripture as one of four sources for theological construction,
34 Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," 166-7.
"Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Is Christianity Reasonable?" Religion in the Making
1(1941): 414.
105
Brightman's radical empiricism was a thoroughgoing method which he
applied even to matters traditionally reserved for theology. He insisted that
theology is reason applied to God. Reason knows no barriers, no
privileges, no separations. Its impartial eye examines every fact, every
belief; every problem, with a view to finding the truth wherever it may
be. Reason cannot regard traditional theology as a finality or its
dogmas as infallible; ... All faiths and revelations are in need of
rational criticism and interpretation.f
Brightman's philosophical method thus led him to reject the theodicies
of traditional theology. In his later A Philosophy of Religion, he discusses
this issue. Religious and theological answers to the problem of evil have
traditionally been premised on God as omnipotent and omnibenevolent. As
such, evil has been understood a) in dualistic terms as issuing forth from a
cosmic adversary such as Satan; b) as the result of the voluntary misuse of
freedom (traditionally called sin) by finite creatures; c) as part and parcel of
what Leibniz, the seventeenth century rationalist philosopher, called "the
best of all possible worlds" set within the context of the larger purposes of
God which are hidden to the human mind; d) in Augustinian terms as
36Brightman, "Religion as Truth," 53; see also Brightman's extended discussion
of the insufficiency of "The Way of Revelation" in The Finding a/God, Chapter ll.
Likewise, Brightman chided his naturalistic and atheistic opponents for allowing their own
dogmatic presuppositions to adjudicate the theistic question, rather than pursuing an
empirical, rational, and impartial assessment of the evidence; see his "Dogma, Dogma,
Who's Got the Dogma?" Religion in Life 2 (1933): 553-62.
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None of these explanations were sufficient for Brightman as they left
privation; or, e) either as punishment (for moral evils) or as discipline (for
non-moral evils).
too many unanswered questions. (A) was not viable within a monistic
framework of reality; (b) did not explain natural evils; (c) was, in some
ways, a leap beyond reason, and thus, not an option; (d) did not sufficiently
take into account the empirical facts of evil; and (e) undermined the notion
of divine justice. 37 Since his goal was a "coherent hypothesis which will
include and explain all the theses and antitheses of experience [on] the
battlefield of good-and-evil.''" he was thereby led from the question of
theodicy to his conception of God as both finite and infinite.
With the publication of The Problem of God in 1930, Brightman's
modernism was articulated at length. Later termed "The Finite-Infinite
37 Brightman, A Philosophy 0/Religion, 259-72; Brightman also discusses, in a less
comprehensive and less systematic fashion, the problems of traditional theodicies in
Chapter IV of The Problem 0/ God titled "The Contraction of God."
"Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, 251. Not surprisingly, Brightman's
emphasis on rational coherence has led some critics to fault him for an "exaggerated
emphasis upon subjective and cognitive aspects of experience" (James Alfred Martin, Jr.,
Empirical Philosophies of Religion [1945; reprint, Freeport NY: Books for Libraries
Press, 1970], 114). As one attempting to integrate the findings of modem science into a
viable philosophical theology, Brightman would have insisted that such was intrinsic to the
task at hand.
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God, ,,39 his theory was, in spite of a long history of theistic finitism in
western philosophy, an "explicit, original, and fully worked out finitism.?"
The original contribution of Brightman is to be found in his doctrine of The
Given, by which he rejected the classical doctrine of divine omnipotence.
His related doctrine of theistic temporalism denied the traditional notion of
divine immutability. Both evidence his radical empiricism brought to full
fruition and will be examined in order.
Brightman most fully defined The Given in his chapter on "The
Resultant Idea of God" which deserves to be reproduced at length:
God is a conscious Person of perfect good will. He is the source
of all value .... Therefore his purpose controls the outcome of the
universe. His purpose and his nature must be inferred from the way
in which experience reveals them, namely, as being gradually attained
through effort, difficulty, and suffering. Hence there is in God's very
39 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Personality and Religion (New York: Abingdon
Press, 1934), 71-100.
40 John H. Lavely, "Edgar Sheffield Brightman: Good-and-Evil and the Finite-
Infinite God," in Deats and Robb, eds., The Boston Personalist Tradition, 122. In The
Problem of God, 10, Brightman pointed to Francis J. McConnell's Is God Limited? (New
York: Abingdon Press, 1921)--which argued that God was limited by creation, human
freedom, and the Incarnation-as the most influential of all the literature on theistic finitism
that he consulted. Other more well known advocates of theistic finitism include Plato, the
nineteenth century British philosopher J. S. Mill, the French personalist Charles Renouvier,
and William James. Brightman also mentions the lesser known finitism of his
contemporary, William Pepperell Montague, a student of James. For a historical sketch,
see Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, 286-301. For a more extensive critical analysis
of nineteenth and early twenty century finitists, see Rannie Belle Baker, The Concept 0/ a
Limited God (Washington DC: Shenandoah Publishing House, 1934).
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nature something which makes the effort and pain of life necessary.
There is within him, in addition to his reason and his active creative
will, a passive element which enters into every one of his conscious
states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and
constitutes a problem for him This element we call The Given. The
evils oflife and the delays in the attainment of value, in so far as they
come from God and not from human freedom, are thus due to his
nature, yet not wholly to his deliberate choice. His will and reason
acting on The Given produce the world and achieve value in it."
Brightman then goes on to set forth the four types of evidence which
lead to the assertion that God is limited by The Given." First is the already
referred to facts of evolution which reveal a cosmic drag that demands a
revisioning of the classical attributes of God derived from an a priori method
such as divine omnipotence and divine immutability. Secondly, the nature of
consciousness and personality, when applied to God, both limit the divine
will (an expression of active and passive elements, like our own) and
knowledge (of the free future acts of other rational creatures, like us).
Thirdly, the principle of dialectic points to the ongoing divine "struggle" in
41Brightman, The Problem a/God, 113 (emphasis mine). Brightman's later
writing on The Given demonstrates further reflection: "The Given consists of the eternal,
uncreated laws of reason and also of equa11yeternal and uncreated processes of nonrational
consciousness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects (qualia), disorderly
impulses and desires, such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of space and time,
and whatever in God is the source of surd evil" (A Philosophy a/Religion, 337).
42Brightman, The Problem a/God, 126-38.
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achieving a higher meaning or synthesis.i" Finally, he points to the religious
value of The Given and advances theological evidence for his view as
demonstrated in the suffering of God and the cross of Christ. As he
poignantly writes in a later book:
Jesus reveals a God who bears an eternal cross; and it is this cross
which I have called The Given .... The cross tells us that God
somehow finds suffering and death necessary to his ends. Easter tells
us that suffering and death are not final; that personality survives
death; and that no obstacles can block the advance of the divine
purpose. From the point of view of my own special terminology, if
Good Friday is The Given, Easter is The Control of The Given ....
In a word, there is no problem which God cannot solve. Such is the
God revealed in Jesus."
In The Finding of God, Brightman further describes five aspects of
The Given'": as part ofthe conscious content and conscious experience of
God; as part of the complexity of the divine nature, including the rational
and moral law, and "an eternal subject-matter (conscious ... not physical)
which eternal divine thought and goodness have to reckon with in all their
dealings, as human thought has to reckon with sense data;" as eternal and
therefore unlikely to ever be completely eliminated, yet with the "hope that it
43 Here, Brightman is explicit in his indebtedness to Hegel (Ibid., 135-6).
"Brightman, Is God a Person?, 80-I.
45 Brightman, The Finding of God , 174-7; quotes following cited here also.
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may be raised to higher and higher levels, and that it may enter into
increasingly beautiful and holy creations as the endless future advances;"
as internal to God so as to avoid any cosmic dualism; as controlled (not
created) by God who thus limits the evils and havoc which an unrestrained
Given would wreak in the universe." Rather than the traditional view of
divine omnipotence, Brightman thus opts for theistic finitism as the more
reasonable hypothesis for resolving the problem of evil.
To be expected, Brightman's theory of a finite God eternally
confronted with this indomitable Given was the target of numerous
criticisms from both conservative and liberal scholars alike." Almost
"In an exposition of Brightman's theism, Rufus Burrow, Jr. has rightly called
attention to the cumulative significance of these aspects of The Given. He admonishes that
for Brightman, consciousness "is a complex unity within which are found distinguishable
but inseparable functions. The nonrational Given within God's nature is so inextricably
interwoven into the being of God, along with God's reason and active will, that there is no
need to worry about a dualism within the divine consciousness. The emphasis is on unity,
and consequently, the indivisibility of consciousness. Much of the credibility of
Brightman's theory of the Given turns on this emphasis. If one fails to understand the
significance of unity in the World Ground it will not be possible to adequately understand
the hypothesis of the finite-infinite God. . ." ("The Personalistic Theism of Edgar S.
Brightman," Encounter 543:2 [Spring 1992]: 178).
47 On the one hand, an orthodox evangelical like Gordon Clark argued that
Brightman could (should) just as well conclude that God is both finite and evil, rather than
finite and good (A Christian View of Men and Things [Grand Rapids Ml: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1952], 277). On the other hand, the process theologian
David Ray Griffin has said that Brightman's doctrine of God having an internal problem is
"the unorthodox conclusion that has been lurking for centuries in the closets of classical
theism" (God, Power, & Evil: A Process Theodicy [philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1976], 250). One statement summarizes the feeling of most critics: God himself, because
III
immediately, Knudson himself raised several objections to the theory,
preferring the traditional answer given to the problem of evil which
combined an appeal to divine omnipotence along with a plea for human
ignorance." The result, conjectured by the Neo- Thomist critic, John James
McLarney, is that by the time Brightman published Personality and
Religion in 1934, he had modified his theistic finitism in the direction of a
finite-infinite God.49 While this may be true, no substantial differences can
be detected in Brightman's personalistic theism. As infinite, God is "the
of the insurmountable Given, "stands in awe of the Given" (Daniel Callahan, "Human
Experience and God: Brightman's Personalistic Theism," American Philosophy and the
Future, ed. Michael Novak [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968],235). This was
already pointed out in an early criticism by Andrew Banning who concluded that The
Given, as stated by Brightman, may "at some future time develop a new emergent aspect
which will either fundamentally alter the nature of God or confront him with situations for
which his principles will prove inadequate" ("Professor Brightman's Theory of a Limited
God. A Criticism," Harvard Theological Review 27:3 [July 1934]: 168) .
.. On Knudson's objections, see The Doctrine of God, 273-5. His evangelical spirit
affirmed that "If the existence of evil requires us to affirm either the divine impotence or
human ignorance, and if one theory is logically as tenable as the other, faith will have no
hesitancy in making its choice in favor of the latter" (Ibid., 366). See Brightman's
response in "The Given and Its Critics," Religion in Life 1:1 (1932): 134-45.
49 John James McLarney, The Theism of Edgar Sheffield Brightman (S.T.D.
dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1936), 147. McLarney also thought that the
absence of "The Given" in Brightman's Personality and Religion was testimony to the fact
that he had abandoned the doctrine. While absent terminologically, however, The Given is
an integral part of the book. McLarney overlooks the fact that Personality and Religion
was originally intended for ''the average educated man" ("Preface"), and was not meant as
a technical philosophical treatise. That The Given appears again in substantially the same
form in both of Brightman's later books on philosophical theology (Philosophy of Religion
and Person and Reality) witnesses to the fact that he did not abandon this doctrine.
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source of all being [and] his will is the energy and striving which eternally
creates value and order"; as finite, God is not willfully responsible for the
futility and evils of existence: "they are God's suffering as well as ours. ,,50
Brightman's radical empiricism also led him to hold that a finite-
infinite God should also be both temporal and eternal. This was intimated
as such in The Problem of God. 51 This notion is further developed in a later
essay, where Brightman discusses more extensively the thesis that "the God
of religion, from everlasting to everlasting, is a temporal being," and that
"eternity is a function of time, not time of eternity.,,52 As evidence, he points
to human experience, the historical process, the idea of progress, and the
process of development by which moral ideals are realized. 53 He concludes
that God is unbegun and unending, "a God of many universes and of many
evolutions. ,,54
50 Brightman, Personality and Religion, 100.
"Brightman wrote that, "For to call God temporal is not to deny that he is eternal;
it is only to deny he is timeless, or that he is not intimately related to and concerned with
events in time" (The Problem of God, 130).





Thus, activity, change, and duration are to be predicated of God.
AI; Brightman later states, "All being is temporal and therefore all being is
personal.v" While the concept of eternity is an abstraction oftemporality,
God is real. AI; really existing, God is temporal, and time acts as a divine
limit. Time is, however, also the "condition of his personal perfection [and]
his endless productivity.v" Mutability, then, is intrinsic to the divine
experience as it is to the human.
In another essay, Brightman questioned whether Bowne himself--who
followed Kant in seeing time as existing only in the phenomenal realm and
not as real in itself--was true to the personalist axiom that only personality
could unravel the problem of change and identity. While there is evidence
that Bowne at times saw the temporality of God as the logical personalistic
conclusion, he was, as Brightman put it, "caught between his Kantianism
and his personalism." Being influenced by the strong eternalistic tradition of
philosophy and religion, Bowne never achieved coherence on this matter
(and, as far as Brightman was concerned, neither did Knudson whose
"Brightman, Person and Reality, 135. Against Kant's doctrine of the ideality of
time, Brightman argues for the ontological reality of time in Chapter 7 of this book.
16Brightman, The Finding of God, 131. See also Chapter V of Brightman's The
Spiritual Life (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1937), titled "Spirit as Developing."
114
positioned differed little, if at all, from Bowne's). Brightman could only
conclude that "when Bowne speaks as an eternalist, he tends toward the
abstract and impersonalistic.T"
Brightman's deviation from classical theism can be seen as the logical
by product of his philosophic method. As examples of his "finite-infinite"
theism, God is not simply omnipotent, but able to do only the doable.
Further, rather than being metaphysically immutable, only God's moral
nature-Jove, justice, mercy, etc.--is unchanging. By redefining such divine
attributes as omnipotence and immutability, Brightman argued that the
resultant idea of God was more religious and personal than absolutistic
theism ever could be.58 Further, the accompanying theodicy provided for a
reconciliation of the modem mind with religion and theism. God is no
longer viewed as a cosmic monarch, but rather as a fellow-sufferer.
These, however, are not the only advantages of his modernistic vision
of God. A God rescued from the shackles of classical theism was now also a
57 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Bowne: Eternalist or Temporalist," The Personalist
28 (1947): 257-65; quotes from pp. 259 and 265. On this point, Brightman found
agreement from Jose A. Franquiz Ventura, Borden Parker Bowne's Treatment of the
Problem of Change and Identity (Rio Pedras, Puerto Rico: University of Puerto Rico
Press, 1942), esp. 160-78.
5. See Chapter II of Personality and Religion, titled" A Personal God."
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God relieved of western parochialism and rendered universally accessible.
As Brightman himself concluded, "The finite-infinite God ... is a God who
himself has a task and who seeks the cooperation of all men in bearing
burdens, facing problems, and lifting humanity from its bondage and
degradation.t'Y Brightman's modernism, therefore, called for a catholic
approach to religion along the road toward a religious pluralism.
BRIGHTMAN THE RELIGIOUS PLURALIST
Brightman's ecumenism and religious pluralism were based on what
he called the "metaphysical ideal." In contrast to the "dogmatic ideal" that
"locates ecclesiastical authority on earth in the infallible Word and the
infallible Church," Brightman proposed a metaphysical ideal that
locates authority in God alone, a God who not merely tolerates
differences of opinion, but also uses those differences as a means of
bringing his followers nearer to him, and nearer to one another. ...
The metaphysical ideal may not offer any greater prospect of
immediate agreement among churches than does the dogmatic, but it
proposes a method of growth toward harmony and a more generous
view of divine purpose. 60
'"Ibid., 128; italics mine.
60 Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "The Church, the Truth, and Society," Theology and
Modern Life: Essays in Honor of Harris Franklin Rall, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (Chicago:
Willett, Clark, & Co., 1940), 262.
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This emphasis on a "growth toward harmony," grounded theologically in the
Bownean doctrines of the "Fatherhood of God" and the "brotherhood of all
humanity," was central to Brightman's views on ecumenism and religious
pluralism. I will look at each in order.
Brightman spoke approvingly of the developing ecumenism of the
inter-war period. He correctly recognized that the lines of division between
denominations open to ecumenism and those that were closed were drawn
over the question ofthe nature ofthe church and the nature oftruth. As a
metaphysician, he could not but define both in terms consistent with his
radical empiricism. As such, he understood the church to be "a social
institution, ... consist[ing] of all experiences of individuals which arise in
connection with what they acknowledge as a church, that is, as a body of
Christian believers organized for purposes of Christian worship and other
appropriate activity. ,,61
This broadly defined ecclesiology allowed Brightman much greater
latitude than even many liberals of the era were willing to concede in
defining the limits of ecumenical relations. Whereas some Methodist
ecumenists were willing to include all the recognized denominations in the
61 Ibid., 253.
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ongoing dialogue.f Brightman himself did not see any need to stop at
denominational lines. Thus, he insisted that "empirically, Quakers, Baptists,
Christian Scientists, Witnesses of Jehovah, Latter-day Saints, angels of
Father Divine, Anglo-Catholics, Methodists, Roman Catholics, Lutherans,
and Presbyterians are all on an equality.,,63
By refusing to define the church in doctrinal terms, Brightman was at
one with the modems of his generation. The institution of the church is"but
one example of what Brightman called "Objective Spirit," whereas the
spiritual church is a much more adequate symbol ofthe World Spirit that is
personal, social, divine, free, eternally developing and increasing value in the
cosmos.f" For Brightman, of course, one's membership in the spiritual
church is based on only one's spiritual development, and not on any
adherence to particular ecclesiastical doctrines.
62 See Ivan Lee Holt, "Methodism and Ecumenical Christianity," in Anderson, ed.,
Methodism, 283-90, whose survey of Methodist attitudes toward ecumenism during the
Interwar-period reveals a concern only for inter-denominational ecumenical advance. Holt
does not mention ecumenical relations with sectarian groups on the fringes of Christianity.
63 Brightman, "The Church, the Truth, and Society," 253. Brightman's catholicity
is seen here to include groups that even up to the present time are labeled as cultic--such as
the Christian Scientists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and Father Divine-and therefore
outside the historic Christian tradition.
64 See Brightman, The Spiritual Life, passim; on the visible church as "Objective
Spirit," see Ibid., 94-99. The influence of Hegel on this point is evident.
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Brightman thus insisted that the basis of the authority of the Gospel
was not creedal formula but human experience. As he said in an address
delivered at the United Methodist Council Conference in February, 1938,
The chief basis of faith is love; that is, the source of the authority of
the gospel is the living experience of co-operation. Experience gives
birth to all creeds and doctrines, and by it all creeds and doctrines
must be tested experimentally. The experience oflove verifies the
creed of love."
The related question regarding the nature of "truth" was approached
in very much the same way. Truth, as Brightman emphatically stated, "is a
social function, whatever else it may be.,,66 This view of truth, along with
his empirical approach to religion as a whole, moved Brightman finally
toward accepting religious pluralism.
Whereas Bowne came to a greater appreciation of other religions after
his world tour in 1905, he nevertheless was unable to conceive of them as
.5Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "The Gospel as Cooperation," Vital Religion: A
Crusading Church Faces Its Third Century, ed. Otto Nail (New York: The Methodist
Book Concern, 1938), 47. Brightman had earlier argued for religious experience as an
"autonomous source of knowledge" ("The Dialectic of Religious Experience," The
Philosophical Review 38 [1929]: 557-73). Later, however, he rescinded from this position
and argued for a more comprehensive empirical approach requiring rational coherence.
Experience could never be one's only source of religious knowledge; rather it it necessarily
had to be interpreted by reason (see especially Brightman's summary thoughts on this
subject in Part I of Person and Reality titled "Experience and Reason").
66 Brightman, "The Church, the Truth, and Society," 263.
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anything other than "lesser lights" in comparison with Christianity.f" This
religious inclusivism also characterized the views of President Warren, well
known among Methodists as their "mentor in world religions. ,,68
Brightman's modernistic theism, however, did not allow him to resist the
religious pluralism demanded by his underlying philosophical method.
While early in his career Brightman was able to speak rhetorically of
religious ideals in pluralistic terms," he was not completely free to accept
religious pluralism until he had, with his doctrine of the finite God, escaped
from the clutches of authoritarian Christianity. It is in the chapter on "The
Way of Revelation" in The Finding of God that Brightman first reveals his
thoughts on religious pluralism. In commenting on biblical passages which
have been traditionally secured as prooftexts for the exclusivistic position,
Brightman says
67 Bowne wrote in 1908 that since "we have come to believe that the great non-
Christian systems also had their place in God's providential plan for men ... , Christianity
does not envy any of these lesser lights" (Personalism, 290-1).
68 See Donald K. Bishop, "William Fairfield Warren (1833-1929), Mentor of
World Religions," Methodist History 6:4 (July 1968): 36-43.
69 Thus, he comments that "not Jesus of Nazareth only, but Confucius, Buddha,
Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza, with many others, have seen in love ... the consummation
of personality and the source of infinite growth" (A Philosophy of Ideals, 130).
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either these passages mean that human knowledge of Christ and
conscious acceptance of him are absolutely essential to finding God,
or else they mean that the actual God revealed in Christ is the only
God there is and that he alone saves everyone who is saved--whether
they are "of this fold" or not, and whether they say, "Lord, Lord" or
not. This latter view is so much more in harmony with the character
of Jesus himself and of the Heavenly Father of whom he taught that I
take it to represent the true intent of the "exclusivist" passages."
Brightman's religious pluralism is forcefully stated in his prognosis
for Christianity written in 1937. There, he unequivocally asserted that "the
Christian Church will come to recognize in Buddhism and Hinduism,
Confucianism and Mohammedanism, other roads to God. The Christian will
treat representatives of these religions as brothers, not as heathen enemies
of the faith.,,71 Later, in 1947, Brightman went so far as to acknowledge the
Indian mystic-philosopher, Sri Ramakrishna (1&34-&6), as an avatar, and to
compare him to Jesus, who "acquired the name of Christ, the Messiah."n
Although "avatar" is not defined in this context, Brightman does not appear
7°Brightman, The Finding of God, 41; Brightman is commenting on John 10:7-18,
the "fold" referring to the Christian church, and Matthew 7:21-23, the "Lord, Lord"
referring to those who appeal to the divine judge for entry into the Kingdom of Heaven.
71Edgar Sheffield Brightman, The Future of Christianity (New York: The
Abingdon Press, 1937), 80.
72 Originally a tribute on the occasion of Ramakrishna's birthday anniversary given
by Brightman in Boston and later published as "Sri Ramakrishna," Prabuddha Bharata, or
Awakened India 52 (November 1947): 452.
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to be deviating from the standard definition of the term which describes a
Hindu incarnation of deity. Most importantly, however, he seems to clearly
suggest that the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is by no means
unique. 73
Brightman's own life was an exemplary demonstration of non-
partisan religion. He was, for example, very sympathetic toward Hindu
1975), and Swami Akhilananda (1894-962).74 The fact that some of his
mysticism, as seen in his frequent citations of the Bhavagad Gita, and in his
relationships with the Indian philosophers, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-
73 Brightman's sympathies for the avatar doctrine of Hinduism are evident in an
essay written at the end of his life. There, he writes approvingly of the Hindu view of the
incarnation as "a principle exemplified in many instances. Buddha, Christ, and Sri
Ramakrishna, for example, are all avatars, all incarnations of God in man in a supremely
lofty sense" ("Goals of Philosophy and Religion, East and West," Philosophy East and
West 2 [1952]: 16).
74 On Radhakrishnan, see Brightman's article, "Radhakrishnan and Mysticism,"
The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor
Publishing Company, 1952), 393-415, reprinted in Studies in Personalism: Selected
Writings of Edgar Sheffield Brightman, 142-58, wherein he displays both a breadth and
depth of insight into Hindu mysticism.
Regarding Akhilananda, a third generation devotee of Ramakrishna and leader of
The Vedanta Society at Providence, Rhode Island, Joanne C. Brown has described him as
Brightman's "good mend" from whom Brightman learned much about Hinduism
("Brightman, Edgar Sheffield (1884-1953)," Dictionary ojChristianity in America, eds.,
Daniel G. Reid, et. al. [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1990], 189). In pursuing
the details of this friendship, I have discovered that over the last ten years of his life,
Brightman maintained a voluminous correspondence with the Swami, of which more than
300 letters survive under the Akhilananda File and the Brightman Papers at the Mugar
Memorial Library of Boston University (Telephone Interview with C. Niles, Mugar
Library, Boston University, 13 January 1995). He also contributed an affectionate
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books were translated into other languages (Chinese, Japanese, Spanish and
Portuguese) is further testimony to his global appeal and his religious
pluralism.
SUMMARY OF BRIGHTMAN'S CONTRIBlITION TO
MODERNISM AND PLURALISM IN METHODIST THEOLOGY
Brightman's life work was devoted to applying thoroughly the
personalistic method toward the formulation of a philosophy of life. This
included a more radical and empirical approach to the problems of religion.
It should not be surprising that the problem of evil was an especially acute
one for Brightman, who himself had endured through two world wars and
the Great economic depression of the 1930s. His theistic modernism was
therefore an impressive apologetic effort to meet both the religious and
intellectual demands ofthe times.
Foreword to the Swami's Hindu Psychology, concurring with the latter's acknowledgment
"of divine reality in every religion" (Brightman, "Foreword" to Hindu Psychology: Its
Meaning for the West, by Swami Akhi\ananda [New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers,
1946], xii). Further testimony of the pluralistic spirit that Brightman imparted to his
students can be found in the wann memories which third generation personalists like Peter
A. Bertocci, L. Harold DeWolf, John H. Lavely, Walter G. Muelder, Janette Newhall, and
S. Paul Schilling recorded of the Swami in his posthumously published Spiritual Practices:
Memorial Edition with Reminiscences by His Friends, eds. Alice May and Claude Alan
Stark (Cape Cod, MA: Claude Stark Co., 1974); see especially the contributions by
DeWolf and Lavely in this volume which describe Brightman's deep respect and
appreciation for the Swami's spiritual leadership
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As expected, his criterion of empirical coherence eventuated in a
categorical rejection of the Bible as an exclusive source of revelatory truth.
As one theologian puts it, Boston personalism, "basing its understanding of
God upon rational probabilities, has no place for this kind of
supernaturalism.t'" Further, his insistent appeal to experience inevitably
led him to shed most of the evangelical pietism of Bowne and evangelical
liberalism of Knudson in favor of a religious pluralism. The journey from
the pietism of late nineteenth century evangelicalism to the pluralism of mid-
twentieth century Protestantism is seen to culminate, for American
Methodism, in the work of Professor Brightman.
What remains to be considered is the specifics of how the
philosophical method of personalism shaped the direction of theology at
Boston University and demanded the conclusions reached by Brightman.
This will be the task of the concluding chapter.
15 John B. Cobb, Jr., Living Options in Protestant Theology (philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1962), 74.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
My thesis throughout this study has been that the overall movement
of American Methodism from pietism to liberalism and to pluralism was
enacted in the transition from the evangelical pietism of Borden P. Bowne to
the religious pluralism of Edgar S. Brightman. In Chapter III, I showed that
while Bowne was one of the first to articulate an evangelical liberal
Methodist theology based on his personalistic philosophy, the influence of
his pietistic heritage was one that he never completely rejected. As the third
generation personalist Walter G. Muelder, tells us, this has led some to
accuse Bowne of "substituting faith for reason, and theology for
philosophy."!
Nevertheless, Bowne's theological writings served to secure the place
IWalter Muelder, along with Peter Bertocci, et. al., "The Renaissance of Bowne:
A Symposium .... ", Bostonia 34 (Fall 1960): 25; so also the judgment ofG. Watts
Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy (New
YOlk The Century Co., 1933), 315. For this and other reasons, Bowne has never
received the kind of recognition of which his thought is deserving from the philosophical
world.
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ofliberalism in the Methodist Episcopal Church. In fact, two American
philosophers of religion during the 1930s, Henry Wieman and Bernard
Meland, implied such when they admitted that, "When one reads the works
of Borden Parker Bowne today, one is amazed to see how fully they express
the generally accepted liberal view among Christians of our time.,,2
It is, however, only in the systematic application of personalistic
principles to the entire field of Christian theology that Albert C. Knudson
was able to construct a theology freed from the grip of pietistic prescriptions.
These efforts I have recounted in Chapter IV. The personal testimony of
Muelder (who studied under both Knudson and Brightman) is therefore
characteristic of many a Boston University student of the 1920s, when he
recalls experiencing the liberating influence of Boston personalism and the
Social Gospel from the "individualistic evangelical pietism" which pervaded
the ecclesiastical atmosphere of his boyhood.' The scope of Knudson's
work undoubtedly led both Wieman and Meland to see "the philosophy of
2 Henry Nelson Wieman and Bernard Eugene Meland, American Philosophies of
Religion (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1936), 139.
3 Walter G. Muelder, "An Autobiographical Introduction: Forty Yean; of
Communitarian Personalism," The Ethical Edge of Christtan Theology, Toronto Studies in
Theology, vol. 13 (New York and Toronto: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1983), 1.
126
personalism as most true to the Christian tradition?' in comparison with
other prevalent philosophies of religion during the Interwar period.
This conclusion, however, is premature, especially when one takes
the work of Brightman into consideration. Only by skewing the definition
of "the Christian tradition" can one say that Brightman's theistic finitism
and religious pluralism are within the boundaries of historic Christianity.
It is to his credit, however, to have pushed the postulates of personalism to
their logical theistic (finitistic) and religious (pluralistic) conclusions.
It is true that Bowne the theologian can hardly be faulted for failing to
see the predisposition of personalism toward pluralism. In defense of his
theological exclusivism, it should be reiterated that Bowne's philosophical
and theological energies were directed elsewhere; further, the question of
religious pluralism was not one that had really been formulated at the tum of
the century. Knudson also, writing as first and foremost a theologian, was
interested primarily in Christian ecumenism, and was never led to address
the inter-faith subject in his writings."
4 Wieman and Meland, American Philosophies of Religion, 133.
5 Knudson does briefly compare Christian ethics with those of other religions in The
Doctrine of Redemption, 423-28; he does not, however, discuss soteriological issues in that
context. That he was an inclusivist who believed in Christianity as superior to all other
religions can be seen from the following: "Christianity does not stand apart from all other
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With regard to Brightman's creative theodicy, Knudson the theologian
was never quite satisfied with the religious value of his colleague's theistic
finitism. It is not so certain, however, whether Bowne the philosopher, who
always insisted on clarity of thought, can rightly be said to have been
thoroughly consistent with his personalism in choosing to retain classical
absolutism against some form of theistic finitism.
On this point, Professor Rufus Burrow, Jr. has shown that Bowne, the
absolutist, was "either not willing or unable to press the questions and the
facts of experience far enough to conclude against the classical view of the
omnipotent-omnibenevolent God."6 Here, although Bowne briefly
entertained the idea of God as internally limited," his pietistic inclinations
may have caused him to revolt against the notion. As Professor Burrow
concludes, Bowne the philosopher, was "at least a closet finitist, i.e., one
religions as alone divine. It is not an island separated from the great human mainland. It
is, rather, a mountainpeak rising up out of the broad plane of human need and human
aspiration. It is the climax of the natura!, not its antithesis. And is so far as it is such, in so
far as it expresses and satisfies the deepest and highest needs of the human spirit, it may
without hesitancy be accepted as valid" (The Validity of Religion Experience, 196).
6Rufus Burrow, Jr., "Borden P. Bowne's Contribution to Theistic Finitism,"
unpublished manuscript made available to the author, 2.
7 Bowne hastily dismissed the thought of God as "able to do the doable but as
limited by some necessities, probably self-existent and eternal, which cannot be
transcended" (Theism, 190; lowe this reference to Professor Burrow).
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who had more sympathy for theistic finitism than he was willing to confess
publicly.?" He further points out that while Bowne's "personalistic method
breaks down" at primary points, Brightman the metaphysician was bold
enough to recognize that "what is at stake is not the kind of God one would
like to believe in, but whether or not one has the courage and character to
accept the kind of God supported by the facts.?"
Students of Bowne, Knudson and Brightman have continued in the
. paths charted by these founding personalists. Whether it be the social ethics
of McConnell and Muelder; the philosophical gains of Ralph T. Fwelleling
(who founded and edited The Personalist while at the University of
Southern California), Peter Bertocci and John Lavely (the latter two also
taught at Boston University); the theological contributions of Georgia
Harkness, Harold DeWolf; and S. Paul Schilling (all of whom have been
recognized theological leaders in the Methodist church since its Unification);
or the social personalism of Martin Luther King Jr. (who received his Ph.D.
under Brightman, DeWolf; Muelder and Schilling, and acknowledged his
indebtedness to the Boston tradition); the worth of the person and the
"Burrow, "Borden P. Bowne's Contribution to Theistic Finitism," 3.
9 Ibid., 2.
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centrality of personality have continued to be emphasized as axiomatic in the
personalist tradition. By all accounts, the work of the early Boston
personalists can be seen to have readily influenced the mid-twentieth century
middle of the road to liberal theological opinions dominant across the
spectrum of American Methodism.lO
The influence of Brightman's modernism and pluralism has also
continued to the present. His theistic finitism has been held by a small but
significant minority group including Harkness, Lavely, Bertocci, and
Muelder. It is today being re-articulated with vigor in the writings of
Professor Rufus Burrow. Further, Brightman's religious pluralism has also
been evidenced in the work of some of his students. The Swedish
theologian, Nels F. S. Ferre, one of Brightman's prized students, is an
example. In The Finality of Faith and Christianity among the World
Religions, Ferre categorically rejects the belief that only Christianity is true
and that all other religions are pagan and therefore false. While he insists
that his is not a religious "pluralism," he is hard pressed to distinguish
between what he calls his own "inclusivism" from the clear cut pluralism of
10 So S. Paul Schilling, Methodism and Society in Theological Perspective (New
York: The Abingdon Press, 1960), 153.
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By all accounts, this religious pluralism can be seen as analogous to
the mid-twentieth century theological situation in American Methodism. Of
this, William McCutcheon has correctly observed that "there is no single
Methodist theology.v'f To be sure, the early Boston personalists have
played an important role in the development of Methodist theology in this
century. Whatever the future of the Boston personalist tradition in this
scenario, however, from its own sources, it can be said to be full of promise
in spite of any mitigating circumstances. As Brightman wrote during the
midst of World War II,
The sum of the whole matter is that the spiritual life is indeed a life of
struggle, but is also a life of well-grounded hope. Hope is grounded in
freedom, and freedom is grounded in all the high purposes and
powers of spirit, human and divine. The last word of the spirit is
Victory. 13
11 Nels F. S. Ferre, The Finality of Faith and Christianity among the World
Religions (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), 87 ff
12 William J. McCutcheon, "American Methodism and the Theological Challenges
of the Twentieth Century," Forever Beginning, 1766-1966: Methodist Bicentennial
Historical Papers (Lake Junalaska, NC: Association of Methodist Historical Society,
1968), 163. As examples of the theological pluralism in Methodist circles at mid-century,
McCutcheon points to neo- Reformationism, neo-Iiberalism, personalism, existentialism,
naturalism, ecumenism, Death of God, Church renewal, linguistic, and process theologies,
Wesley studies, and theological ethics. "You mention the frontier," he concludes, "and a
Methodist writer has been there."
13Brightman, The Spiritual Lift, 213.
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